Feb. 5, 2026

Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Andrew Guthrie Ferguson on Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance

Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Andrew Guthrie Ferguson on Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance
Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Andrew Guthrie Ferguson on Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance
Keen On America
Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Andrew Guthrie Ferguson on Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance


A man was convicted by his own heartbeat — and that's just the beginning of our digital dystopia.


About the Guest

Andrew Guthrie Ferguson is Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School and a national expert on surveillance technologies, policing, and criminal justice. He is an elected member of the American Law Institute and the author of the PROSE Award–winning The Rise of Big Data Policing. His new book, Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance (NYU Press, March 2026), examines how smart devices and digital surveillance are transforming criminal prosecution — and what the law must do to catch up.

About This Episode

Following yesterday’s conversation with Christopher Mathias about doxxing and the ethics of unmasking, Andrew Keen turns to the legal side of the same question: what happens when the data we generate about ourselves becomes evidence? Andrew Guthrie Ferguson joins the show from Washington, D.C. to discuss his new book — a deeply researched investigation into how pacemakers, smartphones, smart cars, and doorbell cameras are being used to convict people in court, and why the law has almost nothing to say about it.

The conversation moves from a man convicted by his own heartbeat to AI-powered real-time crime centres, from Eric Schmidt’s infamous privacy defence to masked ICE agents in Minneapolis, and from Bentham’s panopticon to Ferguson’s proposed “tyrant test” — a framework for designing data protections by imagining the worst leader with access to your most intimate information.

Chapters:
00:00 Introduction: Digital privacy and unmasking
The theme of digital privacy and what it means to be unmasked in a data-driven world

01:25 Meet Andrew Guthrie Ferguson
Introducing the guest and his new book on privacy, surveillance, and the law

02:10 The Dual-Edged Sword of Digital Devices
How our everyday devices expose everyone and the complicated trade-offs that creates

03:40 From “Don’t Be Ashamed” to Privacy Nuance
The shift from early Silicon Valley privacy optimism to a more complex reality

04:45 Regulating Government, Not Google
Ferguson’s focus on keeping personal data out of court rather than off corporate servers

05:55 The Pacemaker Data Court Case
How personal medical device data was used as evidence in a criminal trial

07:30 Convicted by His Own Heartbeat
An arson and insurance fraud case where heart-rate data contradicted the suspect’s story

09:40 Google’s Three-Part Warrant System
How tech companies helped shape rules for law enforcement access to location data

11:15 The Fourth Amendment Digital Gap
What reasonable expectations of privacy mean in the modern digital environment

12:45 Digital Privileges and Intimate Data
Whether certain types of personal data should be legally protected like confidential relationships

14:20 Surveillance Battles on the Ground
Protests, law enforcement, and the evolving intelligence dynamic in Minneapolis

16:05 “Just Doing Our Job” and State Surveillance
The common defence of surveillance practices and why it remains controversial

18:10 The Texas Drone Fleet
Drones as first responders and the expansion of aerial policing technology

20:45 Real-Time Crime Centers and Mass Cameras
Integrated camera networks, data fusion, and the lack of clear oversight

22:50 The Tyrant Test for Privacy Laws
Designing privacy protections assuming the worst possible leader has access to the data

25:15 AI Supercharges Surveillance
How artificial intelligence turns ordinary cameras into powerful tracking tools

27:30 AI-Assisted Police Reports
Using body-camera audio and AI tools to generate reports and the implications for justice

29:10 No Turning Back From Technology
Why abandoning digital tools isn’t realistic and why new laws may be needed instead

31:15 Closing: Every Smart Device Is Surveillance
The idea that modern connected devices inherently function as surveillance tools


Links & References

Mentioned in this episode:


About Keen On America
Nobody asks more impertinent questions than the Anglo-American writer, filmmaker and Silicon Valley entrepreneur Andrew Keen. In Keen On America , Andrew brings his sharp Transatlantic wit to the forces reshaping the United States — hosting daily interviews with leading thinkers
and writers about American history, politics, technology, culture, and business. With nearly 2,800 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting.
Website | Substack | YouTube

00:00 - Introduction: Digital privacy and unmasking

01:25 - Meet Andrew Guthrie Ferguson

02:10 - The Dual-Edged Sword of Digital Devices

03:40 - From “Don’t Be Ashamed” to Privacy Nuance

04:45 - Regulating Government, Not Google

05:55 - The Pacemaker Data Court Case

07:30 - Convicted by His Own Heartbeat

09:40 - Google’s Three-Part Warrant System

11:15 - The Fourth Amendment Digital Gap

12:45 - Digital Privileges and Intimate Data

14:20 - Surveillance Battles on the Ground

16:05 - “Just Doing Our Job” and State Surveillance

18:10 - The Texas Drone Fleet

20:45 - Real-Time Crime Centers and Mass Cameras

22:50 - The Tyrant Test for Privacy Laws

25:15 - AI Supercharges Surveillance

27:30 - AI-Assisted Police Reports

29:10 - No Turning Back From Technology

31:15 - Closing: Every Smart Device Is Surveillance

0:00 Hello, my name is Andrew Keen. Welcome to Keen on America, the Daily Show about everything that matters with the world's leading commentators and thinkers. Hello everybody. It's Thursday, February the fifth, 2026. Yesterday we did a show, uh, with the journalist Christopher Mathias, uh, who has a new book out to catch a fascist, the fight to expose the Radical, right, that seemed to suggest that, uh, anti Antifa has a right to unmask neo-Nazis.

0:55 And we had an interesting conversation about the. Unite the right rally in Charlottesville back in 2017 and whether one has the right or not to expose people who were involved in that rally. It's all of course about privacy and indeed shame. We are. Again, talking about privacy today, perhaps in a more legal way with my guest, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, who has a new book out. "Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Policing in the Age of Self Surveillance." Uh, Andrew is joining us from Washington DC. He teaches, uh, law at, uh, GW Law School.

1:37 Uh, Andrew, I know this is beyond perhaps the focus of your book, but when it comes to exposing what people are up to in their political lives, what is your take on on this extremely controversial issue? Controversial, of course, both on the left and the right. I think it points to a a point that is discussed in the book, although I don't obviously touch on that issue, which is that our data exposes us, it exposes everyone. Uh, whoever is communicating with some kind of, uh, digital device in their pocket, uh, is uh, uh, exposed. And it has a duality to it, right?

2:17 Sometimes it's useful for law enforcement to find people. Sometimes, uh, people who are protesting and dissenting, uh, get exposed. And as you were just talking about, it can work the other way around. The point is, uh, uh, maybe it was in your earlier discussion that there really aren't really laws or rules or regulation or constitutional, uh, protections about this data. Uh, my focus on the book is about how. The police and prosecutors and the government can use data against us. Uh, but obviously this sort of exposure of data, uh, has a double edged. Yeah. And a very sharp double edge, unfortunately. Uh, Eric Schmidt fa, uh, when he was CEO of Google, back in, I think it was 2008 or oh nine, famously said about online privacy.

3:00 Uh, you shouldn't be ashamed of anything you do, uh, or if you are ashamed, don't do it. How would you respond to that? At the point, at that point at least, was a fairly typical Silicon Valley. To the issue of privacy now, I think it's a little bit more nuanced. Well, I think the really hard questions about data privacy general and about what information Google could collect, uh, I think they're actually more narrow and tailored and perhaps solvable issues about controlling what the government can do with that information. So, for example, I do like the fact that I can Google in a search query whatever I'd like to. Uh, query. Uh, and I would wish that data could stay with between me and Google and not necessarily be turned into evidence against me in a court of law.

3:47 And part of what the book does is, uh, rationalize or, or, or wrestle with that tension. There is a reason why we all have acceptance or the seduction of self surveillance. There's the reason why. We buy, you know, watches that monitor our heartbeat or buy cameras that we put on our front door. There's a reason for that. Um, but what I don't think we've really wrestled with is that that data that we create can be used against us in a court of law, uh, and has been and will be. And, um, that presents its own danger. So in the book, I actually proposed solutions not for Google, collecting our data or data privacy or data protection writ large, but more about how to regulate. Government use of it and prosecution use of it against individuals.

4:29 Uh. Does it depend, of course on how one views government and its rights in terms of citizens? I mean, what rights should government have, uh, Andrew when it comes to what you call policing in the age of self surveillance? Well, I think there are certain things that, uh, we would like to eat product. Lemme give you a good example. So I think we can all agree that a digital. Pacemaker, something goes in your heart that keeps your heart beating and records, uh, your heart beat and gives it to your doctor. Is a a good, it's an objective. Good we, that is saving lives.

5:10 It's important and it's something that we should be investing in for innovation and everything else. At the same time, we might also agree that that data about your smart heartbeat should not be available to detectives who can go to your doctor's door with a warrant and get it and use against you. And use it against you in a court of law. And that's happened in a case I discussed in the book. And I think that balance is there. The person being charged in that case was arguably committing a crime, but that's his heartbeat being used against him. And I think that we should be able to design laws that balance, that very good need for having digital conveniences and innovations that have changed our world for good.

5:50 Uh, but at the same time controlling how that information can be used against us. Give me more details on that heartbeat case. Why did the police wanna use his heartbeat and what was the crime and what was the outcome? So there's this guy who basically was committing a insurance fraud using arson. Uh, he was burning down his house and, uh, he came up with his whole story about how he had rescued everything right in time. And he told us, you know, it's an elaborate lie, uh, about this in order to get the insurance, uh, uh, uh, uh. Money, uh, which again is a, is a crime. And so detectives wanted to disprove his story by showing that his heartbeat wasn't responding the way it would've been if you were running around in the middle of a fire, uh, trying to save all of your possession.

6:39 So they went and they got, uh, the heartbeat and they used it against him, and he was sort of convicted, uh, based on his own heartbeat. And again, that's a hard story. Like this is. A crime. It's uh, uh, something that we, we don't want to support. At the same time, this is intimate data that really was sort of involuntary given, like, I mean, I guess it could have chosen not to have a pacemaker and not stay alive, but once you have that, it seems like we might be able to carve out protections about certain sensitive data, certain information that maybe we don't want the government to have. What's been the typical response, Andrew? Silicon Valley when it comes to this issue of self surveillance and the, the data that can be used by the police.

7:20 I know Apple in particular, uh, have been quite resistant to giving to, to, to opening iPhones for the police for one reason or other. What it, it can, one, make some rules about Silicon Valley's commitment or lack of commitment to providing data for the police. I think the, the problem is that currently the only protections are really coming from the companies themselves. There really isn't a law that controls it. Even if you're thinking about, you know, uh, Google, which has been collecting sort of location data and came up with its own three part warrant. So law enforcement could get access to this or what they call the censor vault, basically all of our location data.

8:05 But it was Google's lawyers who actually came up with the idea of having this three step process. It wasn't like a judge saying this what the fourth amendment holds, or this is, uh, a legislative determination. It was like Google's lawyers. Now that case is actually going before the Supreme Court, uh, just got granted certs going up to, to be decided. Um, but again, the point is the company's making these these calls, so Apple has seen that it's in their business interest. To be more privacy protective. Uh, Google has essentially said, go sold you a cheaper phone, but made the money back on the data that they were collecting from that phone. Uh, and unfortunately now of course, all of those tech companies are somewhat. Beholden to a, uh, governmental administration in the US that is, you know, playing pretty tough.

8:49 And I, I, I think it'd be hard for, for companies to push back the same way, um, that they had when they have all these other large government contracts, uh, at issue. Apple is sort of in a different boat than, you know, Microsoft or Google or Amazon or any of those other big companies. What rights can and should we have when it comes to these issues? I know that you focus in your book on the fourth Amendment. You might explain, uh, what the Fourth Amendment is and how it connects. But if one is indeed guilty of a crime burning down the house in order to get insurance money, why shouldn't the government use any kind of data it can get access to, to make its case if indeed we are guilty?

9:32 Well, that is actually the cur, almost the current law, right? That, uh, there if you create data, it can be used against you. In fact, you know, the truth of the matter is there is nothing. Too private, too secret that the government can't access, uh, with a warrant. So, you know, your digital diary, your period app, your health monitor, your smart bed, whatever it is, uh, if the government can get a warrant to get access to it, and sometimes they don't even need a warrant. Um, they can use it. And so that is the current default. I think that that default, uh, devalues sort of a sense of not just privacy, but also gives the government more control. I think that, uh, we've seen, uh, potential abuses of that technology, that sort of use of.

10:18 Uh, surveillance technology, even in the last like month or two where we've seen a government that has seen, uh, a fit to go after journalists and podcasters and, uh, protesters who are out, uh, on the streets. Uh, and so I think that we might want to, uh, have a balance. I actually think it's a kind of a bipartisan issue because you never know who's gonna be in charge of, uh, the government, but we might wanna have a balance about. Should there be higher limits? You know, maybe something more than a warrant to be able to get access to this? Should there be particular areas that are just so private and so intimate that the police can't get it, uh, no matter what, uh, that might lie under like a Fourth Amendment understanding of like a reason why.

10:59 Just explain, uh, sorry, Andrew, for, for our, our non-legal audience, what the Fourth Amendment is. Sure. So the Fourth Amendment comes from the United States Constitution that governs, uh, unreasonable searches and seizures. So taking things, but also taking data. Uh, the Supreme Court, uh, has said that the controlling standard is whether or not we all have a reasonable expectation of privacy in something, what that means in a digital age. It's honestly kind of an open question still being debated. The court has said in a case called Carpenter that your cell site location data, so the data that's revealed when you walk around, uh, the, uh, world, uh, requires a warrant to get access to it.

11:41 Uh, but there have been many other pieces of information where the court has held that there is no, quote unquote, reasonable expectation of privacy. And police can get it for any reason or no reason, just because they want it. Um, so you could have a system where you could have a warrant. Or you could even, and this is some of the proposal in the book, go even beyond that to say maybe there's certain areas that should be essentially privileged. It's like when you're, when a client and a lawyer are talking, they're something called an attorney-client privilege, where those communications just can't be used in court. When two married people are speaking, that communication is privileged. Why? Because we. Value something else besides the ability to use data against someone in a court.

12:21 We value the sanctity of marriage. We value the sanctity of an attorney-client privilege. And I think that there, there are some pieces of our digital world, uh, that also deserve that kind of privilege or, so I, I make the argument in the book, this isn't gonna make the police very happy is. No, no, it's not. Um, I, I think, you know, the police and, and honestly the tech companies sort of like the status quo, where there really isn't regulation. The Fourth Amendment is still debating things in kind of an analog pre-digital world. Uh, and that means the technology proceeds a pace. And sometimes, you know, the, the book is honestly filled with stories of, uh, uses that get a bad guy and, and, and lock 'em up.

13:03 And I wrestle with that. Uh, honestly, I, I'm trying to show that there is a positive to it. Uh, but I also think the danger of that is that that same data can be used to, you know, track it. Police officers, ex-girlfriend, or as we're seeing in Minneapolis, like go after, uh, protestors or people who are, uh, using their First Amendment rights, uh, in ways that are deeply uncomfortable that the police, you know, without, uh, the proper requirements, even if you call something a crime, it, everything becomes available. Uh, that you can use the same power in a real authoritarian way. You used the Minnesota example, uh, the Minneapolis example, Andrew Bit.

13:43 A lot of people would argue outside the law that the, the, the, the, the current regime and certainly the behavior of ice in Minneapolis is unconstitutional, perhaps even illegal. So, uh, can that example really be used? I mean, you can always find examples of the police or a state overstepping. The boundaries, but that in itself doesn't mean that there shouldn't be laws should there. I do think that there should be laws. In fact, the book is filled with suggestion suggestions that there should be laws, but there are not.

14:25 And and what's really chilling is that the technologies that ICE and, and the Customs Border Patrol are using right now in Minneapolis can be used by local law enforcement or the FBI in the same way. And there isn't a clear, uh, sense that it is automatically unconstitutional. You have to wait for the Supreme Court to, to claim that it is or state that it is. Um, and the. That we are seeing, and this is what's interesting. We are seeing a very aggressive use of new technologies, new surveillance technologies as we've never seen before against, uh, otherwise, uh, relatively privileged, uh, population that was not normally the target of surveillance. And so like the aperture of surveillance ha has expanded to target people who weren't normally targeted and suddenly everyone's saying, wow, this feels a little too much.

15:12 Whereas that same technology can be used against. Anyone, unless there was a countervailing law or a constitutional rule saying it can't be, and right now we don't really have that. How aggressive has the police become? I know that there are lots of cases in which. Seems as if local police forces are becoming increasingly greedy for data. And there's one, uh, example where the Texas State police has more than doubled their drone fleet. Um, are there great differences between state police forces and are there any guidelines on what the police can and can't do in terms of collecting data about us?

15:59 There are no. Like external guidelines. Obviously police departments themselves might write the rules that limit themselves, but there's no federal law or state law that's going to control it. They're actually for drones as that example. There are a few like FAA laws that sort of control like safety issues around, you know, drones flying ahead. But in terms of like. We have many cities now that are adopting drones as first responders. So imagine a nine one one call goes out, a drone response before the police officer taking a video of what's happening there, which again, from a tactical strategy, uh, uh, perspective for the police is. Very helpful for them. They can, if you have a realtime crime center, uh, which again is a new sort of idea of like fusing all these video streams together, analysts at the realtime crime center can see what's going on with the drone.

16:46 They can then go to the various cameras that are right around, uh, the area. They can even like go get access to like the police officer's body camera and be able to, to see what's going on. Incredibly powerful, uh, uh, change for police to get eyes on the ground quickly. There aren't real, uh, you know, like external rules about what they can do, uh, with that data. Um, sometimes it's helpful, sometimes it's not. Um, but it's definitely a change and it's a change that we haven't talked about part of the book, which is, you know, on the theme of self surveillance, it's sort of this democratic self surveillance. This is like a mediated democratic self surveillance where we have chosen to spend our tax dollars, uh, on these camera systems and these drones.

17:28 And I think we should have a debate about whether we're okay with them. When it comes to these kinds of debates, do do American citizens tend to be somewhat paranoid? There's more and more fear of big tech on lots of different fronts, especially with ai. And I wanna talk about AI a little bit later in our conversation, but. Where do we get balance in terms of this conversation? On the one hand, we have legal scholars like yourself. On the other hand, we have sort of hardcore libertarians who don't believe that the government have any rights to any information about us. Where, where, what is the model for beginning to figure this stuff out? Is it back in the 19th century?

18:08 The beginning of the print, uh, mass printing press. Well, I do think we are on like a, a moment of evolution, if not revolution, about, uh, the power of surveillance. And you can just look at China and see what happens when you have a, you know, city that is like just covered in cameras everywhere you go. And it's not just cameras, it's video analytics like baked into the camera so you can identify. Individuals and objects and where they've gone, whether they're doing anything right or wrong. Uh, and then connecting all those data sets to who they are and what they do and their social credit score. And the rest, like we actually have the technology in the world, in America. We're sort of developing it in our local way because policing is a very local, uh, uh, business.

18:49 Uh, and so people aren't necess. Putting all the pieces together to see this kind of change in law. But I think when you have, I mean, there's a change in technology, but when you have that kind of change in technology and really change in power. We should have a corresponding change in law and have these debates about whether we are okay. And it is true that there will be people who are, uh, completely against any surveillance technology. And then there'll be people who are actually very, you know, pro technology because they sort of like the. You know, if we watch everything, nothing bad will happen. Uh, and then hopefully we can have a debate about how to give the data that we need, if we really need it in a particular case, but maybe protect other interests like First Amendment interests, religious interests, you know, medical interests.

19:34 Like do you really need, uh, automated license plate camera outside the, you know, medical clinic or the, you know, AA meeting or any of those things. Like we could have that debate. It is hard, but it's doable. You bring up the China example and their notorious social credit system. There are lots of cameras around the world, not just in China and London, for example. I think there are more cameras in London than anywhere else, but, uh, the UK still has a constitutional system as opposed to the authoritarian system in China. Can one distinguish them between types of government? I, I think I've already asked this question, but. Some governments are more responsible in terms of how they use this data and how would you compare European models?

20:21 Obviously you've, you've mentioned China with the us. Well, I think what's interesting is I think that the, the origin story of how we reach this point where we have essentially built a surveillance state. Almost where we can do this kind of tracking and um, uh, monitoring of people but haven't panicked yet is in part because up until right about this moment in American history, the people using the technology were. Somewhat moderated and even somewhat concerned, like the Biden administration, uh, was doing internal checks. They had, you know, an AI policy. They clearly were hearing voices of civil libertarians and activists who were against it, and there was a, a sense of restraint.

21:06 I think what just has happened just in the last few months is that we've seen that there are no restraints. The norms are gone. There is no law or constitutional law to fill it. And so we're in a point here in America where the parallels to China are actually stronger than they were, you know, two years ago. And, uh, you know, and maybe you can look to other governments that would do it wisely. And again, the European, um, uh, many European cities have pretty elaborate surveillance systems and people don't seem quite as, uh, uh, uh, worried about it. Um, but. If an election can change that and we can see how, um, power can be used or misused, or how the, the people targeted can change.

21:54 There's a huge debate, probably outside your sphere of interest, Andrew, about the crisis of democracy and the threat of authoritarianism. Do you think one reason why the American democracy seems to be in crisis and we have this shift towards authoritarianism, is this emerging panopticon? I mean, we can blame it all, of course, on. Trump or Stephen Miller or somebody within ice. But are there structural reasons why democracy seems to be increasingly in crisis in the digital age, where the government knows more and more about us through our self surveillance?

22:34 I'm, I'm sure people have made that argument and can make that argument. I, I think that what's interesting now is that. The Trump administration has sort of seen the potential of this surveillance that has been there. I mean, again, the Biden administration was investing in a lot of this technology. They were building out the real time crime centers. They were, um, um, you know, fighting against, you know, Ron Widen, Senator Wen's, like the Fourth Amendment is not for sale. Act like there was like push, like the Biden administration was building this out, but I think they thought it, they were doing it, it wisely and it's only now. Where there's this like, aggressive use of technology that I think the Trump administration has realized, like, wow, if we keep, there's these companies that will sell us this data and we could track anyone we want right now.

23:19 Maybe we're focused on, you know, undocumented people or people protesting, uh, ice, but we could use this for anything. And I think we're still, they, they may be waking up to this power and I think that this is a moment where. People who are now, the new targets of, uh, of, of this power are, are frightened about it. Um, but my point to them and even to the Trump administration is like, you know, president Trump's data was used against him. Like they actually went back and used his data, his texts, uh, and this is a bipartisan fear, like whoever's in power may well abuse this power, and thus we should have rules and regulations and limits. So we will prevent this foreseeable danger.

24:02 When it comes to the, the right to privacy of the American. Founders, who do you think was the wisest? We began this conversation talking about Charlottesville, of course, the home of Thomas Jefferson. I'm guessing in terms of this conversation and the appearance of a, a panopticon like architecture in America be turning in his grave, but did some of the founders anticipate any of this? I think so. So at the end of the book, I, I talk about the tyrant test and I sort of use as a metaphor, but also a plan of action where. The tyrant test says we should imagine the worst. Imagine the tyrant. The tyrant test.

24:42 Tyrant test. Yeah. So the, the, the, the solution, one of the solutions at the end of the book is called the Tyrant test. Uh, and it basically says we should imagine the worst. We should imagine the tyrant reading your most embarrassing Google queries, uh, and finding out everywhere you've gone. And then we should. Plan accordingly. So what would we do structurally? These are big questions that involve big answers. There have to be legislative changes, there have to be judicial changes. We need to have a division of power between federal and state and like community. Maybe even have things like juries and grand juries. Uh, and I say, you know, the model for this tyrant test is America, right? The founding fathers were concerned about the idea of a. Any entity having too much power.

25:23 So they tried to split it apart, tried to have contested, uh, places of power, and we should do the same thing with, uh, data and, and digital surveillance. We should create checks, rights and remedies. We should have, uh, limits of, of juries and grand juries who could sort of vet whether we want this kind of surveillance technology in their community. And we have to have legislative protections and judicial, uh, acts like judges have to actually. Maybe act to protect, uh, individuals when the Fourth Amendment is, uh, you know, at issue. And if we do all of the above and I try to lay 'em out in a more sophisticated way that I'm saying here in the book, we we're moving forward. It's not gonna be a solution to every problem we have, but it's definitely better than what we have now, which is essentially nothing.

26:09 We, what we have now, of course, is AI moving very fast. It was a recent, um, story about perplexity, public safety deal, alarming experts when it comes to policing the police. Ai. How does AI change all this? Andrew? So it's interesting, AI is changing surveillance 'cause it's kind of supercharging. So think about the cameras that we've had, uh, on our city streets for, for ages now. Like everyone's kind of familiar with these cameras, right? But now imagine 'em all going back to that real time crime center just de uh, described and then. Being able to track or identify any objects, so man, woman, child, bus, van blue, van Blue Subaru, Tesla, whatever it is, and be able to separate out all those objects and then track them back in time.

26:54 It's like a time machine. And the way we do that is ai, right? We basically can train the AI to match like. This is what Tesla looks like. This is what a cyber truck looks like. This is what, uh, you know, a Ford looks like. And we have trained the video surveillance so that we have turned ordinary cameras into something wholly new, which is a system of tracking in major cities that have, you know, cameras like Chicago's over 32,000 cameras. Uh, like we are developing a, our own panopticon o of sorts in this way. And behind that is ai. We'll see other smaller pieces. I just read an article about AI assisted police reports, so it's not in the book, but it's the idea of you can take the audio from a pol a a, uh, body camera footage and turn it into a pre-printed chat GPT police report.

27:40 That then becomes the basis of the arrest prosecution and the rest of, uh, the criminal justice system going forward. Fascinating new technology, changing the relationship between police and, and, uh, the community. We're just gonna see more of it. It was interesting in my conversation with, uh, Matts, we talked about the rights and wrongs of wearing masks. From his point of view, he thinks that the left or Antifa have a right to, uh, expose the identity of people on the far right and that they have no right and people working for ice to wear masks. What's your take on masks and anonymity in public?

28:24 Well, I, I haven't read his book, so I, I apologize, but, um, yeah, and he's not, and to be fair, he, he's anything but a legal scholar. He's a polemicist, he's a guy on the left. So I'm not trying to compare, but I'm, I'm curious as to your thinking on our legal right to anonymity on the right, for example, to wear masks if we want to go to a a, a white supremacist rally or a Antifa rally, should we have that right? It's sort of outside my expertise, but just sort of, you know, spit balling here. Uh, I think that individuals should be able to choose whether to mask or not and thus keep a measure of anonymity when they protest.

29:04 'cause it probably cuts both ways. I don't think law enforcement should, I think there's a real troubling, uh, reality that we're seeing masked law enforcement just because we really want a government, uh, and, and police power that's accountable like the whole. You know, sense of why we might trust giving over sort of this carceral power to someone else is because we should implicitly trust that they're following rules, that they understand what they're doing, and there's a transparent way to hold 'em accountable when they. Don't follow those rules. I think masking and not having badge numbers and not doing all the things that we normally have with local policing, uh, undermines that. Uh, but for ordinary citizens, like I, I understand why, you know, I think there's a value in anonymity.

29:50 Um, uh, and, you know, and, and protests. All sorts of debates endlessly. Andrew, again, you don't need me to tell you this about the rise or fall of crime. Uh, every administration seems to be obsessed with Trump in. When, uh, Jeremy Bentham in the late nine, uh, 18th century came up with his idea of the panopticon where everything could be seen. It wasn't that people would actually, everything would be seen, but that people would fear they were being watched, which would enable them, or at least in Bentham's utilitarian. Mind to behave themselves, to obey the law, whether it was in prisons or schools or hospitals.

30:31 Could one, make the argument perhaps in a, in a utilitarian sense that all these cameras are actually good because it means that people are breaking the law less? I think that's the rationale, the Chinese government for, for, uh, putting them on their streets. But I, I think there's a countervailing argument that, you know, the utilitarian argument. Necessarily suppresses the. Outlier, the dissenter, the voice that people don't want to hear or, or see. And that's pretty American. Um, the idea of being able to, uh, do what you want, even if it's uncomfortable to other people. Uh, and so I'm not sure we necessarily live in an, a utilitarian world in that, that sense.

31:15 Um, I also, I'm not sure it necessarily works, like we've had lots of deterrents. So you have deterrence in, you know, cameras and, you know. Seven elevens that still get robbed, and it's not necessarily, it works in that same way. Um, but, uh, I also, I, I think it, it is an understandable argument and I think that it is an argument that needs to be pushed back again because we, I don't think we want. To live in a world where the government can see everything we do and thus judge us for us and possibly penalize us for us, uh, us for it. Um, especially if that data would then be used to prosecute you. Like it can be in China where if you jaywalk, uh, you can get your old face put up on the side and they ticket you for it.

32:02 Um, certainly I don't think, uh, anyone watching is necessarily sympathetic to the Chinese state, but if we had technology, if we carry cameras or smartphones or AI devices around with us, which were increasingly doing, which will reveal everything we're doing, uh, and it did indeed radically reduce crime. What should a government do? Sh should a civilized government in a sense, in this context at least, uh, believe that a degree of crime isn't a bad thing when it comes to freedom. I, I think the danger in that sentence is the definition of crime, right?

32:45 So if crime is seeking out an abortion for your daughter in Texas or Idaho, or a place that's criminal, no. No. Aren't you just questioning the nature of the law and saying that if you don't approve of the law, you have the right to break it? Well, I, I, well, I think that the danger is like when protest becomes criminalized. Criminalized, then it's all about who's defining the crime. Um, I think we could come to a compromise about saying, you know, there's certain crimes and certain times where some of this technology. It can be very useful, uh, and we should have rules about how you get access to it and when you can't get access to it and how you can't abuse it. But I think the one thing we do know is if you had that magical power where everyone was being watched and everything was being controlled by one person, it would most certainly be abused and it would be abused for political reasons, for personal reasons, for financial reasons.

33:37 And I think I, I would rather live in a world where. We didn't have that. And we can deal with a, a little level of, of some crime that probably still gonna exist even when you over the cameras there, um, but isn't gonna be misused in that sort of tyrannical, uh, way. And I think that is what would happen. I, I, I would bet good money, that's what will happen. For better or worse, Andrew, we seem to be living in the future. There's a movie coming out this year called Mercy. Uh, about, uh, an AI world in which intentionality reveals whether or not one's guilty technology is moving so fast.

34:18 H how is this gonna impact, um, criminality and indeed intentionality? Uh, can one be guilty? Intent, uh, of, of, of, of crimes. If, if, if one thinks in that way. So if you take criminal law, uh, you learn about how we as a society don't punish people based on thoughts alone. Um, you learn that we require some kind of act, and so I imagine that whatever, you know, AI Hollywood wants to create, whether it's Minority Report, you know, which is the earlier version of Mercy probably, although I haven't seen Yeah. Minority Report course covered, right?

34:58 I mean, again, a, it will be wrong and b, it, it still hopefully will require people to do some, some kind of act. So it's not just in your head, but more so. If we have these changes, we should have corresponding legal responses that if we're gonna change the nature of power between police and prosecutors and ordinary people, we need to rebalance the protections for those, uh, people as well. Because if we just like, follow the technology, it's probably gonna have not be a happy ending, uh, to that, that that movie.

35:38 Yeah, I'm not sure there is a very happy ending to that particular movie, Andrew, in our age of self surveillance, people are gonna be watching this and getting really, I think, very nervous, probably thinking to themselves, I've gotta give up my smartphone. I'm not gonna go out. I don't want to be seen by cameras. What's your advice to people when it comes to this avalanche of data, self surveillance, and otherwise should people. Consider turning their, their phones off. Most of the time, especially when they're doing something, shall we say, morally dubious, dubious if, if not breaking the law, I think as a general matter, like turning your back on new technology just isn't going to be a, a workable solution, right?

36:25 We live by our smartphones and our smart cars. You can't even buy a car now that isn't tracking you with some, uh, device like that is the norm. We should have laws to protect it. Again, my argument in the book isn't that we need to have like data privacy laws, although we should, I hope someone, you know, does the hard job of figuring out the data privacy, data protection world. But this is like, should this data necessarily be used against us in a court of law and then. If so, what are the, the rules by which you would do it? Maybe the current like warrant system and, and you, for many of the data we're talking about, you don't even need a warrant, but the warrant system might be two weeks. So maybe you need something stronger and we could actually solve that problem.

37:07 The bigger data protection problem of, than having to like, you know, hide your phone is gonna be difficult. But we could pass laws tomorrow saying, you know what? The government can't use this data against you in a court of law. Google can still use it to sell you products, but the government can't use it to, to prosecute you. We haven't had that world, that is sort of a revolutionary, counterintuitive world, but we could, we could have the best of both worlds if we wanted to make these difficult decisions. Well, I think the one thing we've learned from this conversation, Andrew, is that if you are planning to burn down your own house and claim the insurance money, don't use a heart monitor. Is that right?

37:47 That is definitely a, a helpful tip about being careful that you know every smart device you own. It is a surveillance device. Well, on that helpful note for anyone planning to burn down your house, put your, put your phone away. Uh, although some people will be watching this on their phone, uh, very interesting and important new book, your data will be used against you policing in the Age of Self Surveillance. Uh, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, thank you so much for a really interesting conversation. Thank you. It was a pleasure.