Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Andrew Guthrie Ferguson on Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance

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Hello, my name is Andrew Keen.

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Welcome to Keen on America, the Daily Show
about everything that matters with the

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world's leading commentators and thinkers.

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Hello everybody.

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It's Thursday, February the fifth, 2026.

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Yesterday we did a show, uh, with the
journalist Christopher Mathias, uh, who

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has a new book out to catch a fascist,
the fight to expose the Radical, right,

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that seemed to suggest that, uh, anti
Antifa has a right to unmask neo-Nazis.

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And we had an interesting
conversation about the.

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Unite the right rally in Charlottesville
back in 2017 and whether one has

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the right or not to expose people
who were involved in that rally.

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It's all of course about
privacy and indeed shame.

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We are.

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Again, talking about privacy
today, perhaps in a more legal

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way with my guest, Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, who has a new book out.

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"Your Data Will Be Used Against You:
Policing in the Age of Self Surveillance."

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Uh, Andrew is joining
us from Washington DC.

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He teaches, uh, law at, uh, GW Law School.

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Uh, Andrew, I know this is beyond perhaps
the focus of your book, but when it comes

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to exposing what people are up to in
their political lives, what is your take

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on on this extremely controversial issue?

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Controversial, of course, both
on the left and the right.

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I think it points to a a point
that is discussed in the book,

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although I don't obviously touch on
that issue, which is that our data

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exposes us, it exposes everyone.

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Uh, whoever is communicating with
some kind of, uh, digital device in

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their pocket, uh, is uh, uh, exposed.

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And it has a duality to it, right?

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Sometimes it's useful for law
enforcement to find people.

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Sometimes, uh, people who are protesting
and dissenting, uh, get exposed.

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And as you were just talking about,
it can work the other way around.

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The point is, uh, uh, maybe it was
in your earlier discussion that there

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really aren't really laws or rules
or regulation or constitutional,

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uh, protections about this data.

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Uh, my focus on the book is about how.

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The police and prosecutors and the
government can use data against us.

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Uh, but obviously this sort of exposure
of data, uh, has a double edged.

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Yeah.

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And a very sharp double
edge, unfortunately.

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Uh, Eric Schmidt fa, uh, when
he was CEO of Google, back in,

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I think it was 2008 or oh nine,
famously said about online privacy.

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Uh, you shouldn't be ashamed
of anything you do, uh, or if

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you are ashamed, don't do it.

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How would you respond to that?

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At the point, at that point at least,
was a fairly typical Silicon Valley.

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To the issue of privacy now, I think
it's a little bit more nuanced.

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Well, I think the really hard questions
about data privacy general and about

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what information Google could collect,
uh, I think they're actually more

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narrow and tailored and perhaps solvable
issues about controlling what the

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government can do with that information.

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So, for example, I do like the
fact that I can Google in a

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search query whatever I'd like to.

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Uh, query.

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Uh, and I would wish that data could
stay with between me and Google

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and not necessarily be turned into
evidence against me in a court of law.

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And part of what the book does
is, uh, rationalize or, or,

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or wrestle with that tension.

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There is a reason why we
all have acceptance or the

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seduction of self surveillance.

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There's the reason why.

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We buy, you know, watches that
monitor our heartbeat or buy cameras

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that we put on our front door.

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There's a reason for that.

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Um, but what I don't think we've really
wrestled with is that that data that we

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create can be used against us in a court
of law, uh, and has been and will be.

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And, um, that presents its own danger.

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So in the book, I actually
proposed solutions not for Google,

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collecting our data or data privacy
or data protection writ large,

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but more about how to regulate.

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Government use of it and prosecution
use of it against individuals.

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Uh.

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Does it depend, of course on
how one views government and

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its rights in terms of citizens?

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I mean, what rights should
government have, uh, Andrew when

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it comes to what you call policing
in the age of self surveillance?

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Well, I think there are certain things
that, uh, we would like to eat product.

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Lemme give you a good example.

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So I think we can all
agree that a digital.

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Pacemaker, something goes in
your heart that keeps your heart

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beating and records, uh, your heart
beat and gives it to your doctor.

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Is a a good, it's an objective.

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Good we, that is saving lives.

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It's important and it's something
that we should be investing in for

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innovation and everything else.

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At the same time, we might also agree
that that data about your smart heartbeat

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should not be available to detectives
who can go to your doctor's door with a

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warrant and get it and use against you.

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And use it against you in a court of law.

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And that's happened in a
case I discussed in the book.

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And I think that balance is there.

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The person being charged in that case was
arguably committing a crime, but that's

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his heartbeat being used against him.

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And I think that we should be able
to design laws that balance, that

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very good need for having digital
conveniences and innovations that

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have changed our world for good.

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Uh, but at the same time controlling how
that information can be used against us.

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Give me more details
on that heartbeat case.

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Why did the police wanna use
his heartbeat and what was the

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crime and what was the outcome?

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So there's this guy who basically was
committing a insurance fraud using arson.

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Uh, he was burning down his house and, uh,
he came up with his whole story about how

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he had rescued everything right in time.

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And he told us, you know, it's an
elaborate lie, uh, about this in order

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to get the insurance, uh, uh, uh, uh.

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Money, uh, which again is a, is a crime.

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And so detectives wanted to disprove
his story by showing that his

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heartbeat wasn't responding the way
it would've been if you were running

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around in the middle of a fire, uh,
trying to save all of your possession.

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So they went and they got, uh, the
heartbeat and they used it against

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him, and he was sort of convicted,
uh, based on his own heartbeat.

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And again, that's a hard story.

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Like this is.

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A crime.

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It's uh, uh, something that
we, we don't want to support.

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At the same time, this is intimate data
that really was sort of involuntary

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given, like, I mean, I guess it could
have chosen not to have a pacemaker and

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not stay alive, but once you have that,
it seems like we might be able to carve

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out protections about certain sensitive
data, certain information that maybe

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we don't want the government to have.

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What's been the typical response, Andrew?

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Silicon Valley when it comes to this
issue of self surveillance and the, the

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data that can be used by the police.

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I know Apple in particular, uh,
have been quite resistant to giving

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to, to, to opening iPhones for the
police for one reason or other.

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What it, it can, one, make some
rules about Silicon Valley's

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commitment or lack of commitment
to providing data for the police.

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I think the, the problem is that
currently the only protections are really

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coming from the companies themselves.

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There really isn't a law that controls it.

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Even if you're thinking about, you
know, uh, Google, which has been

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collecting sort of location data and
came up with its own three part warrant.

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So law enforcement could get access to
this or what they call the censor vault,

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basically all of our location data.

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But it was Google's lawyers who
actually came up with the idea of

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having this three step process.

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It wasn't like a judge saying this what
the fourth amendment holds, or this

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is, uh, a legislative determination.

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It was like Google's lawyers.

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Now that case is actually going before
the Supreme Court, uh, just got granted

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certs going up to, to be decided.

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Um, but again, the point is the company's
making these these calls, so Apple has

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seen that it's in their business interest.

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To be more privacy protective.

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Uh, Google has essentially said, go
sold you a cheaper phone, but made

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the money back on the data that they
were collecting from that phone.

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Uh, and unfortunately now of course, all
of those tech companies are somewhat.

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Beholden to a, uh, governmental
administration in the US that is,

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you know, playing pretty tough.

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And I, I, I think it'd be hard
for, for companies to push back the

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same way, um, that they had when
they have all these other large

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government contracts, uh, at issue.

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Apple is sort of in a different boat than,
you know, Microsoft or Google or Amazon

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or any of those other big companies.

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What rights can and should we have
when it comes to these issues?

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I know that you focus in your
book on the fourth Amendment.

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You might explain, uh, what the Fourth
Amendment is and how it connects.

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But if one is indeed guilty of a
crime burning down the house in

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order to get insurance money, why
shouldn't the government use any kind

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of data it can get access to, to make
its case if indeed we are guilty?

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Well, that is actually the cur,
almost the current law, right?

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That, uh, there if you create
data, it can be used against you.

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In fact, you know, the truth of
the matter is there is nothing.

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Too private, too secret
that the government can't

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access, uh, with a warrant.

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So, you know, your digital diary,
your period app, your health monitor,

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your smart bed, whatever it is, uh,
if the government can get a warrant

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to get access to it, and sometimes
they don't even need a warrant.

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Um, they can use it.

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And so that is the current default.

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I think that that default, uh, devalues
sort of a sense of not just privacy, but

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also gives the government more control.

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I think that, uh, we've seen,
uh, potential abuses of that

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technology, that sort of use of.

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Uh, surveillance technology, even
in the last like month or two where

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we've seen a government that has seen,
uh, a fit to go after journalists

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and podcasters and, uh, protesters
who are out, uh, on the streets.

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Uh, and so I think that we might
want to, uh, have a balance.

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I actually think it's a kind of
a bipartisan issue because you

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never know who's gonna be in charge
of, uh, the government, but we

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might wanna have a balance about.

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Should there be higher limits?

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You know, maybe something more than a
warrant to be able to get access to this?

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Should there be particular areas that
are just so private and so intimate

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that the police can't get it, uh,
no matter what, uh, that might

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lie under like a Fourth Amendment
understanding of like a reason why.

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Just

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explain, uh, sorry, Andrew, for,
for our, our non-legal audience,

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what the Fourth Amendment is.

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Sure.

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So the Fourth Amendment comes from the
United States Constitution that governs,

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uh, unreasonable searches and seizures.

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So taking things, but also taking data.

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Uh, the Supreme Court, uh, has said
that the controlling standard is

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whether or not we all have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in something,

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what that means in a digital age.

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It's honestly kind of an open
question still being debated.

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The court has said in a case called
Carpenter that your cell site location

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data, so the data that's revealed when
you walk around, uh, the, uh, world, uh,

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requires a warrant to get access to it.

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Uh, but there have been many other
pieces of information where the court

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has held that there is no, quote unquote,
reasonable expectation of privacy.

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And police can get it for any reason or
no reason, just because they want it.

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Um, so you could have a system
where you could have a warrant.

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Or you could even, and this is some of
the proposal in the book, go even beyond

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that to say maybe there's certain areas
that should be essentially privileged.

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It's like when you're, when a client
and a lawyer are talking, they're

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something called an attorney-client
privilege, where those communications

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just can't be used in court.

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When two married people are speaking,
that communication is privileged.

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Why?

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Because we.

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Value something else besides the ability
to use data against someone in a court.

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We value the sanctity of marriage.

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We value the sanctity of an
attorney-client privilege.

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And I think that there, there are some
pieces of our digital world, uh, that

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also deserve that kind of privilege or,
so I, I make the argument in the book,

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this isn't gonna make
the police very happy is.

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No, no, it's not.

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Um, I, I think, you know, the police
and, and honestly the tech companies

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sort of like the status quo, where
there really isn't regulation.

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The Fourth Amendment is still
debating things in kind of

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an analog pre-digital world.

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Uh, and that means the
technology proceeds a pace.

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And sometimes, you know, the,
the book is honestly filled with

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stories of, uh, uses that get a
bad guy and, and, and lock 'em up.

226
00:13:03,170 --> 00:13:04,189
And I wrestle with that.

227
00:13:04,400 --> 00:13:07,310
Uh, honestly, I, I'm trying to show
that there is a positive to it.

228
00:13:07,760 --> 00:13:10,850
Uh, but I also think the danger
of that is that that same data can

229
00:13:10,850 --> 00:13:12,500
be used to, you know, track it.

230
00:13:12,939 --> 00:13:17,110
Police officers, ex-girlfriend, or as
we're seeing in Minneapolis, like go

231
00:13:17,110 --> 00:13:21,130
after, uh, protestors or people who
are, uh, using their First Amendment

232
00:13:21,130 --> 00:13:25,510
rights, uh, in ways that are deeply
uncomfortable that the police, you know,

233
00:13:25,510 --> 00:13:29,470
without, uh, the proper requirements,
even if you call something a crime,

234
00:13:29,470 --> 00:13:31,120
it, everything becomes available.

235
00:13:31,450 --> 00:13:35,350
Uh, that you can use the same
power in a real authoritarian way.

236
00:13:36,220 --> 00:13:41,770
You used the Minnesota example, uh,
the Minneapolis example, Andrew Bit.

237
00:13:43,660 --> 00:13:48,015
A lot of people would argue outside
the law that the, the, the, the,

238
00:13:48,015 --> 00:13:53,444
the current regime and certainly the
behavior of ice in Minneapolis is

239
00:13:54,314 --> 00:13:56,715
unconstitutional, perhaps even illegal.

240
00:13:56,715 --> 00:14:02,085
So, uh, can that example really be used?

241
00:14:02,265 --> 00:14:08,415
I mean, you can always find examples
of the police or a state overstepping.

242
00:14:08,880 --> 00:14:15,300
The boundaries, but that in
itself doesn't mean that there

243
00:14:15,300 --> 00:14:17,610
shouldn't be laws should there.

244
00:14:18,630 --> 00:14:20,130
I do think that there should be laws.

245
00:14:20,130 --> 00:14:23,370
In fact, the book is filled with
suggestion suggestions that there

246
00:14:23,430 --> 00:14:24,810
should be laws, but there are not.

247
00:14:25,080 --> 00:14:30,000
And and what's really chilling is that
the technologies that ICE and, and the

248
00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:34,920
Customs Border Patrol are using right now
in Minneapolis can be used by local law

249
00:14:34,920 --> 00:14:37,080
enforcement or the FBI in the same way.

250
00:14:37,410 --> 00:14:41,940
And there isn't a clear, uh, sense that
it is automatically unconstitutional.

251
00:14:41,940 --> 00:14:45,780
You have to wait for the Supreme Court to,
to claim that it is or state that it is.

252
00:14:46,230 --> 00:14:47,670
Um, and the.

253
00:14:48,025 --> 00:14:50,335
That we are seeing, and
this is what's interesting.

254
00:14:50,335 --> 00:14:54,655
We are seeing a very aggressive use
of new technologies, new surveillance

255
00:14:54,655 --> 00:15:00,564
technologies as we've never seen before
against, uh, otherwise, uh, relatively

256
00:15:00,564 --> 00:15:04,795
privileged, uh, population that was not
normally the target of surveillance.

257
00:15:05,035 --> 00:15:07,855
And so like the aperture of surveillance
ha has expanded to target people

258
00:15:07,855 --> 00:15:10,345
who weren't normally targeted and
suddenly everyone's saying, wow,

259
00:15:10,345 --> 00:15:12,055
this feels a little too much.

260
00:15:12,055 --> 00:15:16,255
Whereas that same technology
can be used against.

261
00:15:16,995 --> 00:15:21,465
Anyone, unless there was a
countervailing law or a constitutional

262
00:15:21,465 --> 00:15:25,485
rule saying it can't be, and right
now we don't really have that.

263
00:15:27,194 --> 00:15:29,954
How aggressive has the police become?

264
00:15:29,954 --> 00:15:31,965
I know that there are
lots of cases in which.

265
00:15:32,760 --> 00:15:38,550
Seems as if local police forces are
becoming increasingly greedy for data.

266
00:15:38,550 --> 00:15:43,200
And there's one, uh, example where
the Texas State police has more

267
00:15:43,200 --> 00:15:45,210
than doubled their drone fleet.

268
00:15:45,750 --> 00:15:51,030
Um, are there great differences
between state police forces and

269
00:15:51,030 --> 00:15:56,100
are there any guidelines on what
the police can and can't do in

270
00:15:56,100 --> 00:15:58,170
terms of collecting data about us?

271
00:15:59,340 --> 00:16:00,060
There are no.

272
00:16:00,390 --> 00:16:01,920
Like external guidelines.

273
00:16:01,920 --> 00:16:05,310
Obviously police departments themselves
might write the rules that limit

274
00:16:05,310 --> 00:16:09,630
themselves, but there's no federal law
or state law that's going to control it.

275
00:16:09,630 --> 00:16:11,550
They're actually for
drones as that example.

276
00:16:11,790 --> 00:16:15,840
There are a few like FAA laws that
sort of control like safety issues

277
00:16:15,840 --> 00:16:17,820
around, you know, drones flying ahead.

278
00:16:18,090 --> 00:16:18,790
But in terms of like.

279
00:16:19,030 --> 00:16:23,170
We have many cities now that are
adopting drones as first responders.

280
00:16:23,170 --> 00:16:27,939
So imagine a nine one one call goes out,
a drone response before the police officer

281
00:16:27,939 --> 00:16:32,140
taking a video of what's happening there,
which again, from a tactical strategy,

282
00:16:32,415 --> 00:16:34,360
uh, uh, perspective for the police is.

283
00:16:34,689 --> 00:16:35,709
Very helpful for them.

284
00:16:35,890 --> 00:16:39,370
They can, if you have a realtime
crime center, uh, which again is a

285
00:16:39,370 --> 00:16:43,329
new sort of idea of like fusing all
these video streams together, analysts

286
00:16:43,329 --> 00:16:45,760
at the realtime crime center can
see what's going on with the drone.

287
00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:49,990
They can then go to the various cameras
that are right around, uh, the area.

288
00:16:49,990 --> 00:16:53,380
They can even like go get access to
like the police officer's body camera

289
00:16:53,589 --> 00:16:55,780
and be able to, to see what's going on.

290
00:16:55,990 --> 00:17:02,050
Incredibly powerful, uh, uh, change for
police to get eyes on the ground quickly.

291
00:17:02,415 --> 00:17:06,615
There aren't real, uh, you know,
like external rules about what

292
00:17:06,615 --> 00:17:08,685
they can do, uh, with that data.

293
00:17:08,984 --> 00:17:11,565
Um, sometimes it's helpful,
sometimes it's not.

294
00:17:11,835 --> 00:17:14,745
Um, but it's definitely a change and it's
a change that we haven't talked about

295
00:17:14,745 --> 00:17:18,405
part of the book, which is, you know, on
the theme of self surveillance, it's sort

296
00:17:18,405 --> 00:17:19,694
of this democratic self surveillance.

297
00:17:19,724 --> 00:17:24,045
This is like a mediated democratic self
surveillance where we have chosen to

298
00:17:24,045 --> 00:17:28,065
spend our tax dollars, uh, on these
camera systems and these drones.

299
00:17:28,214 --> 00:17:31,480
And I think we should have a debate
about whether we're okay with them.

300
00:17:32,655 --> 00:17:37,095
When it comes to these kinds of
debates, do do American citizens

301
00:17:37,095 --> 00:17:39,435
tend to be somewhat paranoid?

302
00:17:39,795 --> 00:17:42,585
There's more and more fear of
big tech on lots of different

303
00:17:42,585 --> 00:17:43,755
fronts, especially with ai.

304
00:17:43,755 --> 00:17:46,875
And I wanna talk about AI a little
bit later in our conversation, but.

305
00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:51,480
Where do we get balance in
terms of this conversation?

306
00:17:51,480 --> 00:17:54,120
On the one hand, we have
legal scholars like yourself.

307
00:17:54,510 --> 00:17:57,540
On the other hand, we have sort
of hardcore libertarians who don't

308
00:17:57,540 --> 00:18:01,139
believe that the government have any
rights to any information about us.

309
00:18:01,139 --> 00:18:06,600
Where, where, what is the model for
beginning to figure this stuff out?

310
00:18:06,600 --> 00:18:08,250
Is it back in the 19th century?

311
00:18:08,250 --> 00:18:10,709
The beginning of the print,
uh, mass printing press.

312
00:18:11,970 --> 00:18:16,860
Well, I do think we are on like a, a
moment of evolution, if not revolution,

313
00:18:16,860 --> 00:18:19,230
about, uh, the power of surveillance.

314
00:18:19,230 --> 00:18:23,490
And you can just look at China and
see what happens when you have a,

315
00:18:23,550 --> 00:18:27,780
you know, city that is like just
covered in cameras everywhere you go.

316
00:18:27,900 --> 00:18:30,810
And it's not just cameras, it's
video analytics like baked into

317
00:18:30,810 --> 00:18:32,280
the camera so you can identify.

318
00:18:32,690 --> 00:18:35,240
Individuals and objects and where
they've gone, whether they're

319
00:18:35,240 --> 00:18:36,500
doing anything right or wrong.

320
00:18:36,770 --> 00:18:39,140
Uh, and then connecting all those
data sets to who they are and what

321
00:18:39,140 --> 00:18:40,550
they do and their social credit score.

322
00:18:40,550 --> 00:18:44,450
And the rest, like we actually have the
technology in the world, in America.

323
00:18:44,450 --> 00:18:47,390
We're sort of developing it in
our local way because policing is

324
00:18:47,390 --> 00:18:49,460
a very local, uh, uh, business.

325
00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:52,010
Uh, and so people aren't necess.

326
00:18:52,350 --> 00:18:57,030
Putting all the pieces together
to see this kind of change in law.

327
00:18:57,270 --> 00:18:59,610
But I think when you have, I mean,
there's a change in technology, but

328
00:18:59,610 --> 00:19:02,865
when you have that kind of change in
technology and really change in power.

329
00:19:03,570 --> 00:19:06,240
We should have a corresponding
change in law and have these

330
00:19:06,240 --> 00:19:07,920
debates about whether we are okay.

331
00:19:08,130 --> 00:19:12,180
And it is true that there will
be people who are, uh, completely

332
00:19:12,180 --> 00:19:14,070
against any surveillance technology.

333
00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:18,180
And then there'll be people who are
actually very, you know, pro technology

334
00:19:18,180 --> 00:19:19,530
because they sort of like the.

335
00:19:19,900 --> 00:19:22,180
You know, if we watch everything,
nothing bad will happen.

336
00:19:22,450 --> 00:19:27,610
Uh, and then hopefully we can have a
debate about how to give the data that we

337
00:19:27,610 --> 00:19:31,210
need, if we really need it in a particular
case, but maybe protect other interests

338
00:19:31,210 --> 00:19:34,510
like First Amendment interests, religious
interests, you know, medical interests.

339
00:19:34,510 --> 00:19:38,620
Like do you really need, uh, automated
license plate camera outside the, you

340
00:19:38,620 --> 00:19:42,550
know, medical clinic or the, you know,
AA meeting or any of those things.

341
00:19:42,550 --> 00:19:43,840
Like we could have that debate.

342
00:19:44,170 --> 00:19:46,090
It is hard, but it's doable.

343
00:19:47,639 --> 00:19:52,800
You bring up the China example and
their notorious social credit system.

344
00:19:52,800 --> 00:19:54,899
There are lots of cameras
around the world, not just in

345
00:19:54,899 --> 00:19:56,280
China and London, for example.

346
00:19:56,280 --> 00:20:00,780
I think there are more cameras in London
than anywhere else, but, uh, the UK still

347
00:20:00,780 --> 00:20:06,330
has a constitutional system as opposed
to the authoritarian system in China.

348
00:20:06,899 --> 00:20:10,229
Can one distinguish them
between types of government?

349
00:20:10,229 --> 00:20:12,600
I, I think I've already
asked this question, but.

350
00:20:13,085 --> 00:20:17,345
Some governments are more responsible
in terms of how they use this data and

351
00:20:18,665 --> 00:20:21,335
how would you compare European models?

352
00:20:21,335 --> 00:20:24,004
Obviously you've, you've
mentioned China with the us.

353
00:20:24,935 --> 00:20:28,835
Well, I think what's interesting is
I think that the, the origin story of

354
00:20:28,835 --> 00:20:34,115
how we reach this point where we have
essentially built a surveillance state.

355
00:20:34,190 --> 00:20:39,200
Almost where we can do this kind of
tracking and um, uh, monitoring of

356
00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:44,930
people but haven't panicked yet is
in part because up until right about

357
00:20:44,930 --> 00:20:49,190
this moment in American history, the
people using the technology were.

358
00:20:49,545 --> 00:20:53,085
Somewhat moderated and even somewhat
concerned, like the Biden administration,

359
00:20:53,385 --> 00:20:55,365
uh, was doing internal checks.

360
00:20:55,365 --> 00:20:57,165
They had, you know, an AI policy.

361
00:20:57,375 --> 00:21:02,265
They clearly were hearing voices
of civil libertarians and activists

362
00:21:02,265 --> 00:21:06,345
who were against it, and there
was a, a sense of restraint.

363
00:21:06,765 --> 00:21:10,695
I think what just has happened just
in the last few months is that we've

364
00:21:10,695 --> 00:21:13,545
seen that there are no restraints.

365
00:21:13,725 --> 00:21:14,925
The norms are gone.

366
00:21:15,794 --> 00:21:17,985
There is no law or
constitutional law to fill it.

367
00:21:18,254 --> 00:21:22,064
And so we're in a point here in
America where the parallels to

368
00:21:22,064 --> 00:21:26,745
China are actually stronger than
they were, you know, two years ago.

369
00:21:27,014 --> 00:21:31,125
And, uh, you know, and maybe you
can look to other governments

370
00:21:31,125 --> 00:21:32,175
that would do it wisely.

371
00:21:32,175 --> 00:21:36,794
And again, the European, um, uh, many
European cities have pretty elaborate

372
00:21:36,794 --> 00:21:42,195
surveillance systems and people don't seem
quite as, uh, uh, uh, worried about it.

373
00:21:42,495 --> 00:21:42,864
Um, but.

374
00:21:44,320 --> 00:21:48,060
If an election can change that
and we can see how, um, power can

375
00:21:48,060 --> 00:21:52,405
be used or misused, or how the,
the people targeted can change.

376
00:21:54,015 --> 00:21:57,585
There's a huge debate, probably
outside your sphere of interest,

377
00:21:57,585 --> 00:22:02,265
Andrew, about the crisis of democracy
and the threat of authoritarianism.

378
00:22:02,775 --> 00:22:07,395
Do you think one reason why the American
democracy seems to be in crisis and we

379
00:22:07,395 --> 00:22:13,455
have this shift towards authoritarianism,
is this emerging panopticon?

380
00:22:13,455 --> 00:22:15,220
I mean, we can blame
it all, of course, on.

381
00:22:16,020 --> 00:22:19,110
Trump or Stephen Miller
or somebody within ice.

382
00:22:19,110 --> 00:22:24,330
But are there structural reasons why
democracy seems to be increasingly in

383
00:22:24,330 --> 00:22:29,520
crisis in the digital age, where the
government knows more and more about

384
00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:32,010
us through our self surveillance?

385
00:22:34,500 --> 00:22:38,250
I'm, I'm sure people have made that
argument and can make that argument.

386
00:22:38,645 --> 00:22:42,240
I, I think that what's
interesting now is that.

387
00:22:42,675 --> 00:22:47,715
The Trump administration has sort
of seen the potential of this

388
00:22:47,715 --> 00:22:48,915
surveillance that has been there.

389
00:22:48,915 --> 00:22:52,185
I mean, again, the Biden administration
was investing in a lot of this technology.

390
00:22:52,305 --> 00:22:54,345
They were building out the
real time crime centers.

391
00:22:54,585 --> 00:22:58,605
They were, um, um, you know,
fighting against, you know, Ron

392
00:22:58,605 --> 00:23:01,785
Widen, Senator Wen's, like the
Fourth Amendment is not for sale.

393
00:23:01,785 --> 00:23:04,185
Act like there was like push,
like the Biden administration was

394
00:23:04,185 --> 00:23:06,795
building this out, but I think
they thought it, they were doing

395
00:23:06,795 --> 00:23:08,715
it, it wisely and it's only now.

396
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:12,860
Where there's this like, aggressive use
of technology that I think the Trump

397
00:23:12,860 --> 00:23:15,830
administration has realized, like, wow,
if we keep, there's these companies

398
00:23:15,830 --> 00:23:19,280
that will sell us this data and we
could track anyone we want right now.

399
00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:22,250
Maybe we're focused on, you
know, undocumented people or

400
00:23:22,250 --> 00:23:25,970
people protesting, uh, ice, but
we could use this for anything.

401
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:30,410
And I think we're still, they, they
may be waking up to this power and

402
00:23:30,410 --> 00:23:32,780
I think that this is a moment where.

403
00:23:33,075 --> 00:23:38,205
People who are now, the new
targets of, uh, of, of this power

404
00:23:38,205 --> 00:23:39,795
are, are frightened about it.

405
00:23:40,155 --> 00:23:43,275
Um, but my point to them and
even to the Trump administration

406
00:23:43,275 --> 00:23:46,125
is like, you know, president
Trump's data was used against him.

407
00:23:46,365 --> 00:23:50,625
Like they actually went back and
used his data, his texts, uh, and

408
00:23:50,625 --> 00:23:54,825
this is a bipartisan fear, like
whoever's in power may well abuse

409
00:23:54,825 --> 00:23:58,305
this power, and thus we should have
rules and regulations and limits.

410
00:23:58,515 --> 00:24:00,820
So we will prevent this
foreseeable danger.

411
00:24:02,090 --> 00:24:05,765
When it comes to the, the right
to privacy of the American.

412
00:24:06,659 --> 00:24:09,060
Founders, who do you think was the wisest?

413
00:24:09,090 --> 00:24:13,169
We began this conversation talking
about Charlottesville, of course,

414
00:24:13,169 --> 00:24:14,970
the home of Thomas Jefferson.

415
00:24:14,970 --> 00:24:19,620
I'm guessing in terms of this conversation
and the appearance of a, a panopticon

416
00:24:19,620 --> 00:24:24,240
like architecture in America be
turning in his grave, but did some of

417
00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:27,179
the founders anticipate any of this?

418
00:24:28,199 --> 00:24:28,889
I think so.

419
00:24:28,889 --> 00:24:32,850
So at the end of the book, I, I talk about
the tyrant test and I sort of use as a

420
00:24:32,850 --> 00:24:35,340
metaphor, but also a plan of action where.

421
00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:39,120
The tyrant test says we
should imagine the worst.

422
00:24:39,300 --> 00:24:39,960
Imagine

423
00:24:40,890 --> 00:24:41,400
the tyrant.

424
00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:42,060
The tyrant test.

425
00:24:42,120 --> 00:24:42,930
Tyrant test.

426
00:24:42,930 --> 00:24:42,990
Yeah.

427
00:24:43,080 --> 00:24:45,780
So the, the, the, the solution,
one of the solutions at the end of

428
00:24:45,780 --> 00:24:47,100
the book is called the Tyrant test.

429
00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:49,950
Uh, and it basically says
we should imagine the worst.

430
00:24:49,980 --> 00:24:54,870
We should imagine the tyrant reading your
most embarrassing Google queries, uh,

431
00:24:54,870 --> 00:24:56,730
and finding out everywhere you've gone.

432
00:24:57,150 --> 00:24:57,660
And then we should.

433
00:24:58,085 --> 00:24:59,075
Plan accordingly.

434
00:24:59,195 --> 00:25:00,665
So what would we do structurally?

435
00:25:00,665 --> 00:25:03,125
These are big questions
that involve big answers.

436
00:25:03,125 --> 00:25:06,185
There have to be legislative changes,
there have to be judicial changes.

437
00:25:06,185 --> 00:25:08,855
We need to have a division
of power between federal and

438
00:25:08,855 --> 00:25:10,535
state and like community.

439
00:25:10,535 --> 00:25:12,995
Maybe even have things like
juries and grand juries.

440
00:25:13,325 --> 00:25:17,345
Uh, and I say, you know, the model for
this tyrant test is America, right?

441
00:25:17,345 --> 00:25:20,600
The founding fathers were
concerned about the idea of a.

442
00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:23,379
Any entity having too much power.

443
00:25:23,560 --> 00:25:27,760
So they tried to split it apart, tried
to have contested, uh, places of power,

444
00:25:27,939 --> 00:25:31,959
and we should do the same thing with,
uh, data and, and digital surveillance.

445
00:25:32,169 --> 00:25:34,419
We should create checks,
rights and remedies.

446
00:25:34,629 --> 00:25:38,379
We should have, uh, limits of, of juries
and grand juries who could sort of vet

447
00:25:38,379 --> 00:25:41,355
whether we want this kind of surveillance
technology in their community.

448
00:25:41,770 --> 00:25:45,010
And we have to have legislative
protections and judicial, uh,

449
00:25:45,010 --> 00:25:46,719
acts like judges have to actually.

450
00:25:47,159 --> 00:25:50,340
Maybe act to protect, uh,
individuals when the Fourth

451
00:25:50,340 --> 00:25:52,560
Amendment is, uh, you know, at issue.

452
00:25:52,830 --> 00:25:56,129
And if we do all of the above and
I try to lay 'em out in a more

453
00:25:56,129 --> 00:26:00,540
sophisticated way that I'm saying here
in the book, we we're moving forward.

454
00:26:00,659 --> 00:26:03,720
It's not gonna be a solution to
every problem we have, but it's

455
00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:06,534
definitely better than what we have
now, which is essentially nothing.

456
00:26:09,345 --> 00:26:13,095
We, what we have now, of
course, is AI moving very fast.

457
00:26:13,095 --> 00:26:18,855
It was a recent, um, story
about perplexity, public safety

458
00:26:19,365 --> 00:26:23,415
deal, alarming experts when it
comes to policing the police.

459
00:26:23,415 --> 00:26:23,895
Ai.

460
00:26:23,895 --> 00:26:26,115
How does AI change all this?

461
00:26:26,115 --> 00:26:26,505
Andrew?

462
00:26:27,345 --> 00:26:29,475
So it's interesting, AI is
changing surveillance 'cause

463
00:26:29,475 --> 00:26:30,615
it's kind of supercharging.

464
00:26:30,645 --> 00:26:35,865
So think about the cameras that we've had,
uh, on our city streets for, for ages now.

465
00:26:35,865 --> 00:26:37,995
Like everyone's kind of familiar
with these cameras, right?

466
00:26:38,235 --> 00:26:40,875
But now imagine 'em all going back
to that real time crime center

467
00:26:40,875 --> 00:26:43,245
just de uh, described and then.

468
00:26:43,650 --> 00:26:47,970
Being able to track or identify any
objects, so man, woman, child, bus, van

469
00:26:48,000 --> 00:26:52,710
blue, van Blue Subaru, Tesla, whatever it
is, and be able to separate out all those

470
00:26:52,710 --> 00:26:54,810
objects and then track them back in time.

471
00:26:54,810 --> 00:26:55,680
It's like a time machine.

472
00:26:55,980 --> 00:26:57,690
And the way we do that is ai, right?

473
00:26:57,690 --> 00:26:59,815
We basically can train
the AI to match like.

474
00:27:00,135 --> 00:27:01,245
This is what Tesla looks like.

475
00:27:01,245 --> 00:27:02,685
This is what a cyber truck looks like.

476
00:27:02,685 --> 00:27:05,055
This is what, uh, you
know, a Ford looks like.

477
00:27:05,235 --> 00:27:09,945
And we have trained the video surveillance
so that we have turned ordinary

478
00:27:09,945 --> 00:27:14,475
cameras into something wholly new,
which is a system of tracking in major

479
00:27:14,475 --> 00:27:18,165
cities that have, you know, cameras
like Chicago's over 32,000 cameras.

480
00:27:18,495 --> 00:27:24,045
Uh, like we are developing a, our own
panopticon o of sorts in this way.

481
00:27:24,045 --> 00:27:25,485
And behind that is ai.

482
00:27:25,805 --> 00:27:27,485
We'll see other smaller pieces.

483
00:27:27,485 --> 00:27:30,725
I just read an article about AI assisted
police reports, so it's not in the

484
00:27:30,725 --> 00:27:35,315
book, but it's the idea of you can
take the audio from a pol a a, uh,

485
00:27:35,345 --> 00:27:40,775
body camera footage and turn it into
a pre-printed chat GPT police report.

486
00:27:40,775 --> 00:27:45,665
That then becomes the basis of the arrest
prosecution and the rest of, uh, the

487
00:27:45,665 --> 00:27:47,345
criminal justice system going forward.

488
00:27:47,765 --> 00:27:51,725
Fascinating new technology, changing
the relationship between police

489
00:27:51,785 --> 00:27:53,915
and, and, uh, the community.

490
00:27:53,970 --> 00:27:55,650
We're just gonna see more of it.

491
00:27:57,060 --> 00:28:01,770
It was interesting in my conversation
with, uh, Matts, we talked about the

492
00:28:01,770 --> 00:28:04,650
rights and wrongs of wearing masks.

493
00:28:04,650 --> 00:28:10,620
From his point of view, he thinks that
the left or Antifa have a right to, uh,

494
00:28:10,620 --> 00:28:15,720
expose the identity of people on the far
right and that they have no right and

495
00:28:15,750 --> 00:28:18,120
people working for ice to wear masks.

496
00:28:18,120 --> 00:28:22,950
What's your take on masks
and anonymity in public?

497
00:28:24,135 --> 00:28:26,324
Well, I, I haven't read his
book, so I, I apologize,

498
00:28:26,415 --> 00:28:28,544
but, um, yeah, and he's not,
and to be fair, he, he's

499
00:28:28,544 --> 00:28:30,705
anything but a legal scholar.

500
00:28:30,705 --> 00:28:33,165
He's a polemicist, he's a guy on the left.

501
00:28:33,165 --> 00:28:37,455
So I'm not trying to compare, but I'm,
I'm curious as to your thinking on our

502
00:28:38,264 --> 00:28:44,355
legal right to anonymity on the right,
for example, to wear masks if we want to

503
00:28:44,355 --> 00:28:50,595
go to a a, a white supremacist rally or a
Antifa rally, should we have that right?

504
00:28:53,085 --> 00:28:56,835
It's sort of outside my expertise, but
just sort of, you know, spit balling here.

505
00:28:57,135 --> 00:29:02,024
Uh, I think that individuals should
be able to choose whether to mask

506
00:29:02,024 --> 00:29:04,875
or not and thus keep a measure
of anonymity when they protest.

507
00:29:04,875 --> 00:29:06,345
'cause it probably cuts both ways.

508
00:29:06,645 --> 00:29:09,825
I don't think law enforcement should,
I think there's a real troubling, uh,

509
00:29:09,825 --> 00:29:14,054
reality that we're seeing masked law
enforcement just because we really want

510
00:29:14,054 --> 00:29:17,895
a government, uh, and, and police power
that's accountable like the whole.

511
00:29:18,650 --> 00:29:25,490
You know, sense of why we might trust
giving over sort of this carceral power

512
00:29:25,700 --> 00:29:30,650
to someone else is because we should
implicitly trust that they're following

513
00:29:30,650 --> 00:29:34,520
rules, that they understand what they're
doing, and there's a transparent way

514
00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:35,420
to hold 'em accountable when they.

515
00:29:35,785 --> 00:29:36,835
Don't follow those rules.

516
00:29:37,045 --> 00:29:40,015
I think masking and not having
badge numbers and not doing all the

517
00:29:40,015 --> 00:29:44,005
things that we normally have with
local policing, uh, undermines that.

518
00:29:44,365 --> 00:29:48,685
Uh, but for ordinary citizens, like
I, I understand why, you know, I

519
00:29:48,685 --> 00:29:50,545
think there's a value in anonymity.

520
00:29:50,905 --> 00:29:54,025
Um, uh, and, you know, and, and protests.

521
00:29:55,995 --> 00:29:57,645
All sorts of debates endlessly.

522
00:29:57,645 --> 00:30:02,115
Andrew, again, you don't need me to tell
you this about the rise or fall of crime.

523
00:30:02,145 --> 00:30:05,145
Uh, every administration seems
to be obsessed with Trump in.

524
00:30:06,960 --> 00:30:10,440
When, uh, Jeremy Bentham in the
late nine, uh, 18th century came

525
00:30:10,440 --> 00:30:13,680
up with his idea of the panopticon
where everything could be seen.

526
00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:18,270
It wasn't that people would actually,
everything would be seen, but that

527
00:30:18,270 --> 00:30:22,080
people would fear they were being
watched, which would enable them, or

528
00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:24,270
at least in Bentham's utilitarian.

529
00:30:25,065 --> 00:30:28,515
Mind to behave themselves, to
obey the law, whether it was in

530
00:30:28,935 --> 00:30:31,515
prisons or schools or hospitals.

531
00:30:31,965 --> 00:30:37,485
Could one, make the argument perhaps in
a, in a utilitarian sense that all these

532
00:30:37,485 --> 00:30:43,185
cameras are actually good because it means
that people are breaking the law less?

533
00:30:44,370 --> 00:30:47,535
I think that's the rationale, the
Chinese government for, for, uh,

534
00:30:47,595 --> 00:30:48,825
putting them on their streets.

535
00:30:48,885 --> 00:30:52,425
But I, I think there's a
countervailing argument that, you

536
00:30:52,425 --> 00:30:53,715
know, the utilitarian argument.

537
00:30:54,135 --> 00:30:56,205
Necessarily suppresses the.

538
00:30:56,580 --> 00:31:00,690
Outlier, the dissenter, the voice that
people don't want to hear or, or see.

539
00:31:00,960 --> 00:31:01,950
And that's pretty American.

540
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:06,780
Um, the idea of being able to,
uh, do what you want, even if it's

541
00:31:06,899 --> 00:31:08,250
uncomfortable to other people.

542
00:31:08,639 --> 00:31:13,620
Uh, and so I'm not sure we
necessarily live in an, a utilitarian

543
00:31:13,830 --> 00:31:15,270
world in that, that sense.

544
00:31:15,690 --> 00:31:19,830
Um, I also, I'm not sure it necessarily
works, like we've had lots of deterrents.

545
00:31:19,830 --> 00:31:22,560
So you have deterrence in, you
know, cameras and, you know.

546
00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:25,070
Seven elevens that still get
robbed, and it's not necessarily,

547
00:31:25,220 --> 00:31:26,720
it works in that same way.

548
00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:34,610
Um, but, uh, I also, I, I think it,
it is an understandable argument

549
00:31:34,850 --> 00:31:39,080
and I think that it is an argument
that needs to be pushed back again

550
00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:40,820
because we, I don't think we want.

551
00:31:41,625 --> 00:31:46,125
To live in a world where the
government can see everything we do

552
00:31:46,185 --> 00:31:51,525
and thus judge us for us and possibly
penalize us for us, uh, us for it.

553
00:31:51,585 --> 00:31:54,555
Um, especially if that data would
then be used to prosecute you.

554
00:31:54,555 --> 00:31:59,535
Like it can be in China where if you
jaywalk, uh, you can get your old face put

555
00:31:59,535 --> 00:32:01,370
up on the side and they ticket you for it.

556
00:32:02,640 --> 00:32:07,470
Um, certainly I don't think, uh, anyone
watching is necessarily sympathetic

557
00:32:07,470 --> 00:32:13,230
to the Chinese state, but if we had
technology, if we carry cameras or

558
00:32:13,230 --> 00:32:18,180
smartphones or AI devices around with
us, which were increasingly doing, which

559
00:32:18,180 --> 00:32:24,300
will reveal everything we're doing, uh,
and it did indeed radically reduce crime.

560
00:32:26,764 --> 00:32:28,564
What should a government do?

561
00:32:28,564 --> 00:32:34,475
Sh should a civilized government in a
sense, in this context at least, uh,

562
00:32:34,504 --> 00:32:39,364
believe that a degree of crime isn't
a bad thing when it comes to freedom.

563
00:32:41,085 --> 00:32:45,195
I, I think the danger in that sentence
is the definition of crime, right?

564
00:32:45,195 --> 00:32:49,875
So if crime is seeking out an abortion
for your daughter in Texas or Idaho,

565
00:32:49,875 --> 00:32:50,774
or a place that's criminal, no.

566
00:32:50,929 --> 00:32:51,090
No.

567
00:32:51,095 --> 00:32:51,195
Aren't

568
00:32:51,195 --> 00:32:56,504
you just questioning the nature of the law
and saying that if you don't approve of

569
00:32:56,504 --> 00:32:58,065
the law, you have the right to break it?

570
00:32:59,325 --> 00:33:06,315
Well, I, I, well, I think that the danger
is like when protest becomes criminalized.

571
00:33:06,959 --> 00:33:11,370
Criminalized, then it's all
about who's defining the crime.

572
00:33:11,850 --> 00:33:14,310
Um, I think we could come to a
compromise about saying, you know,

573
00:33:14,310 --> 00:33:17,730
there's certain crimes and certain
times where some of this technology.

574
00:33:17,940 --> 00:33:21,540
It can be very useful, uh, and we
should have rules about how you get

575
00:33:21,540 --> 00:33:24,210
access to it and when you can't get
access to it and how you can't abuse it.

576
00:33:24,450 --> 00:33:28,080
But I think the one thing we do know
is if you had that magical power where

577
00:33:28,080 --> 00:33:31,500
everyone was being watched and everything
was being controlled by one person, it

578
00:33:31,500 --> 00:33:35,580
would most certainly be abused and it
would be abused for political reasons, for

579
00:33:35,580 --> 00:33:37,620
personal reasons, for financial reasons.

580
00:33:37,980 --> 00:33:40,920
And I think I, I would
rather live in a world where.

581
00:33:41,045 --> 00:33:42,245
We didn't have that.

582
00:33:42,455 --> 00:33:46,985
And we can deal with a, a little level
of, of some crime that probably still

583
00:33:46,985 --> 00:33:51,755
gonna exist even when you over the cameras
there, um, but isn't gonna be misused

584
00:33:51,755 --> 00:33:53,975
in that sort of tyrannical, uh, way.

585
00:33:53,975 --> 00:33:56,405
And I think that is what would happen.

586
00:33:56,525 --> 00:33:58,745
I, I, I would bet good money,
that's what will happen.

587
00:33:59,465 --> 00:34:02,255
For better or worse, Andrew, we
seem to be living in the future.

588
00:34:02,255 --> 00:34:04,985
There's a movie coming out
this year called Mercy.

589
00:34:05,580 --> 00:34:12,480
Uh, about, uh, an AI world in which
intentionality reveals whether or not

590
00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:17,699
one's guilty technology is moving so fast.

591
00:34:18,060 --> 00:34:24,210
H how is this gonna impact, um,
criminality and indeed intentionality?

592
00:34:24,360 --> 00:34:26,880
Uh, can one be guilty?

593
00:34:28,050 --> 00:34:30,600
Intent, uh, of, of, of, of crimes.

594
00:34:30,600 --> 00:34:33,179
If, if, if one thinks in that way.

595
00:34:34,560 --> 00:34:39,690
So if you take criminal law, uh, you
learn about how we as a society don't

596
00:34:39,929 --> 00:34:42,720
punish people based on thoughts alone.

597
00:34:43,290 --> 00:34:49,650
Um, you learn that we require some kind
of act, and so I imagine that whatever,

598
00:34:49,830 --> 00:34:54,240
you know, AI Hollywood wants to create,
whether it's Minority Report, you know,

599
00:34:54,240 --> 00:34:56,880
which is the earlier version of Mercy
probably, although I haven't seen Yeah.

600
00:34:56,880 --> 00:34:58,590
Minority Report course covered,

601
00:34:58,590 --> 00:34:58,890
right?

602
00:34:58,890 --> 00:35:06,390
I mean, again, a, it will be wrong and
b, it, it still hopefully will require

603
00:35:06,390 --> 00:35:08,730
people to do some, some kind of act.

604
00:35:08,730 --> 00:35:10,920
So it's not just in
your head, but more so.

605
00:35:11,610 --> 00:35:18,270
If we have these changes, we should have
corresponding legal responses that if

606
00:35:18,270 --> 00:35:23,040
we're gonna change the nature of power
between police and prosecutors and

607
00:35:23,190 --> 00:35:29,310
ordinary people, we need to rebalance the
protections for those, uh, people as well.

608
00:35:29,490 --> 00:35:32,550
Because if we just like, follow
the technology, it's probably

609
00:35:32,550 --> 00:35:37,290
gonna have not be a happy ending,
uh, to that, that that movie.

610
00:35:38,955 --> 00:35:42,524
Yeah, I'm not sure there is a very
happy ending to that particular movie,

611
00:35:42,524 --> 00:35:46,424
Andrew, in our age of self surveillance,
people are gonna be watching this and

612
00:35:47,234 --> 00:35:50,714
getting really, I think, very nervous,
probably thinking to themselves,

613
00:35:50,714 --> 00:35:52,575
I've gotta give up my smartphone.

614
00:35:52,754 --> 00:35:53,774
I'm not gonna go out.

615
00:35:53,774 --> 00:35:55,395
I don't want to be seen by cameras.

616
00:35:55,875 --> 00:36:03,075
What's your advice to people when it
comes to this avalanche of data, self

617
00:36:03,075 --> 00:36:05,354
surveillance, and otherwise should people.

618
00:36:05,700 --> 00:36:09,045
Consider turning their, their phones off.

619
00:36:10,035 --> 00:36:12,915
Most of the time, especially when
they're doing something, shall

620
00:36:12,915 --> 00:36:16,755
we say, morally dubious, dubious
if, if not breaking the law,

621
00:36:17,985 --> 00:36:22,365
I think as a general matter, like turning
your back on new technology just isn't

622
00:36:22,365 --> 00:36:25,485
going to be a, a workable solution, right?

623
00:36:25,695 --> 00:36:29,385
We live by our smartphones
and our smart cars.

624
00:36:29,385 --> 00:36:31,965
You can't even buy a car now that
isn't tracking you with some,

625
00:36:32,325 --> 00:36:34,935
uh, device like that is the norm.

626
00:36:35,550 --> 00:36:37,590
We should have laws to protect it.

627
00:36:37,590 --> 00:36:42,150
Again, my argument in the book isn't that
we need to have like data privacy laws,

628
00:36:42,150 --> 00:36:45,330
although we should, I hope someone, you
know, does the hard job of figuring out

629
00:36:45,330 --> 00:36:47,010
the data privacy, data protection world.

630
00:36:47,220 --> 00:36:50,730
But this is like, should this
data necessarily be used against

631
00:36:50,730 --> 00:36:53,040
us in a court of law and then.

632
00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:56,279
If so, what are the, the rules
by which you would do it?

633
00:36:56,430 --> 00:37:00,480
Maybe the current like warrant
system and, and you, for many of

634
00:37:00,480 --> 00:37:02,160
the data we're talking about, you
don't even need a warrant, but the

635
00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:03,600
warrant system might be two weeks.

636
00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:07,259
So maybe you need something stronger and
we could actually solve that problem.

637
00:37:07,589 --> 00:37:10,440
The bigger data protection problem
of, than having to like, you know,

638
00:37:10,440 --> 00:37:12,360
hide your phone is gonna be difficult.

639
00:37:12,540 --> 00:37:15,480
But we could pass laws
tomorrow saying, you know what?

640
00:37:15,540 --> 00:37:19,230
The government can't use this data
against you in a court of law.

641
00:37:19,575 --> 00:37:22,995
Google can still use it to sell
you products, but the government

642
00:37:22,995 --> 00:37:24,525
can't use it to, to prosecute you.

643
00:37:24,795 --> 00:37:29,175
We haven't had that world, that is sort
of a revolutionary, counterintuitive

644
00:37:29,175 --> 00:37:32,835
world, but we could, we could have
the best of both worlds if we wanted

645
00:37:32,835 --> 00:37:34,700
to make these difficult decisions.

646
00:37:36,345 --> 00:37:40,035
Well, I think the one thing we've learned
from this conversation, Andrew, is

647
00:37:40,035 --> 00:37:44,085
that if you are planning to burn down
your own house and claim the insurance

648
00:37:44,085 --> 00:37:46,515
money, don't use a heart monitor.

649
00:37:46,515 --> 00:37:47,055
Is that right?

650
00:37:47,625 --> 00:37:51,495
That is definitely a, a helpful
tip about being careful that you

651
00:37:51,495 --> 00:37:53,265
know every smart device you own.

652
00:37:53,325 --> 00:37:54,705
It is a surveillance device.

653
00:37:56,115 --> 00:37:59,774
Well, on that helpful note for
anyone planning to burn down your

654
00:37:59,774 --> 00:38:01,875
house, put your, put your phone away.

655
00:38:01,964 --> 00:38:05,895
Uh, although some people will be
watching this on their phone, uh, very

656
00:38:05,895 --> 00:38:09,254
interesting and important new book,
your data will be used against you

657
00:38:09,254 --> 00:38:11,924
policing in the Age of Self Surveillance.

658
00:38:12,435 --> 00:38:15,615
Uh, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
thank you so much for a really

659
00:38:15,615 --> 00:38:16,785
interesting conversation.

660
00:38:17,145 --> 00:38:17,444
Thank you.

661
00:38:17,444 --> 00:38:17,835
It was a pleasure.