The Sin of Originalism: Rachel Shelden’s Forgotten History of the Political Supreme Court
“Originalism is not the original way of thinking about the Constitution. The past can tell you some things, but it can’t answer our modern problems.” — Rachel Shelden
INTRO
Before the midterms, Jacob Weisberg came on the show to identify eight cowards, including Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, who have enabled the second Trump regime. His charge was that the Chief Justice had become too political. My guest today is no fan of Roberts. But she suggests that this political sin pales in comparison with Roberts’s sin of originalism.
Rachel Shelden is a historian at Penn State, and her new book, The Political Supreme Court, argues that the court was political by design for its first hundred years. Everybody knew it, she says. And that, in itself, wasn’t a problem.
It’s only recently, she reminds us, that we’ve invented the idea that the court is supreme. The justices had no grand courtroom until 1935, sitting in what everyone called the basement of the Capitol. And no robing room either, with justices dressing in front of other lawyers. They came to the bench from cabinets and governorships and Congress, they rode circuit and held jury trials in their own regions, and when they were done they wrote newspaper articles about their own constitutional views. None of this was thought improper, because the Constitution was understood as a political document that belonged to everybody, rather than a legal one that only belonged to the Supremes.
So where did the fiction of legal holiness come from? It began in the 1880s, Shelden says, with the professionalization of the law. It was marked by the founding of the American Bar Association and the establishment of professional law schools. Out of all this, America got the idea that the Supreme Court is the law above the law. That it should never be political.
Originalism arrived a century later to supply the scripture. Bork, Meese, Scalia, and now a bench of self-professed originalists claiming the authority of a founding generation that would have been horrified by a court this powerful and (dishonestly) political. A deep irony, Shelden calls it. The sin of originalism. Not particularly original, but very sinful.
FURTHER READING
• The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History (University of North Carolina Press), by Rachel A. Shelden.
• Supremacy: How Rule by the Court Replaced Government by the People (W. W. Norton), by Nikolas Bowie and Daphna Renan.
• Rachel Shelden, Talking Points Memo.
• KEEN ON AMERICA episodes cited: Jacob Weisberg on collaboration in the Trump era, and Michael G. Miller on the breaking of the Voting Rights Act.
ABOUT THE GUEST
Rachel A. Shelden is associate professor of history at Penn State and director of the George and Ann Richards Civil War Era Center. She took her doctorate at the University of Virginia and is the author of Washington Brotherhood: Politics, Social Life, and the Coming of the Civil War. She sits on the Historians Council on the Constitution at the Brennan Center and writes for Talking Points Memo. The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History is published by the University of North Carolina Press.
ABOUT KEEN ON AMERICA
Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. With 3,000 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is a daily conversation about the ideas, books and arguments shaping the United States. New episodes every day.
00:00:31 Andrew Keen: Hello, everybody. The election has happened. The midterm has happened, and it seems to have changed everything. Before the election, we did a show with Jacob Weisberg, a very prominent American journalist on the left who has a new book out called— Or had a new book out called Profiles in Cowardice: A Study of Collaboration in the Trump Era. It's very much of a pre-election book. And in the book, one of the eight cowards that he profiled was John Roberts, the senior judge, I think that's the wrong way of putting it, in the Supreme Court, the guy who runs the Supreme Court formally or informally. Weisberg suggested that, Roberts knew that Trump was a bad guy, especially in Trump one, but he never really challenged him in Trump two. I wonder what Jacob now thinks about the current state of American politics. He seems to suggest that, Roberts was too political, taking the assumption that our Supreme Court justices should always be apolitical or above politics. My guest today, though, Rachel Shelden, might disagree. I'm not sure she would necessarily disagree with the Weisberg book or indeed his critique of Roberts, but she certainly reminds us of a very different time in American political and legal history. Her new book is called The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History, and she focuses on the political nature of nineteenth century, the nineteenth century American Supreme Court. She's a professor at State College, Pennsylvania, and that's where she's joining us from. Rachel, congratulations on the book. I'm not sure if you— You've, Weisberg got a lot of coverage actually for the book. But, and, I— I'm sure you're not gonna defend John Roberts. But would it be fair to say that most people assume these days that members of the Supreme Court, either of the left or the right, should be above politics?
00:02:46 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. Public opinion polls show this. Actually, the court has a much lower approval rating when people believe that the court is acting more politically. So it's been a view of Americans for some time now that, justices should be above or outside politics. And it's certainly the argument that many of them make. They will claim, that they are not politicians in robes, that they're not political hacks. And Chief Justice Roberts very much is focused on that narrative.
00:03:17 Andrew Keen: To what extent, did Roberts— Or is Roberts partly responsible for creating that narrative? I know that you wrote an interesting piece for Talking Points Memo recently, where you linked to a piece by Lisa Graves about how John Roberts won over the Bush supreme— at the Bush White House and remade the Supreme Court. Is Roberts' remaking of the Supreme Court one piece of this imaginary idea, an ideal, which, of course, is a farce [unclear], of an apolitical Supreme Court?
00:04:01 Rachel Shelden: I think that he is just furthering an argument that people had started to make in the twentieth century to be sure he is able to promote it more because there are no justices now who came from political positions, who had a background in politics the way they did, for all of the first part of American history and much of the twentieth century. So justices, you know, they leave law school, they clerk for the Supreme Court, other lower federal courts, then they have a legal career. They go through the federal courts, and then they end up on the Supreme Court. And that sort of pipeline from law through judging to the Supreme Court suggests, or at least in Roberts' telling, that there is no political nature to these folks.
00:04:47 Andrew Keen: Yeah. It's almost like a legal technocracy as if these people can be above the law. Where did it come from? I mean, your new book focuses, as I said, on, the political nature of, the Supreme Court, the nineteenth century Supreme Court. When the founders imagined this third branch of government, how did they think of justices, and how did they think of the law? Did they imagine it was above, politics? I know that you got your PhD in Charlottesville, the university that Thomas Jefferson built. What's— What was Jefferson's sense of the role of justices in the law in maintaining American democracy?
00:05:32 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. So the framers believed that the court should be a political institution. So they designed it to be a political institution and then operated as a political institution in practice. And I think one piece that it sort of provides the underlying point here is that we today think about the Constitution as a legal document and lawyers frequently talk about it as a legal document. But for the first one hundred years of American history, people did not think about the Constitution that way. They thought about it as a political document with some legal elements to it. But as a document that they could access and they could talk about, it didn't belong especially to the Supreme Court. Early Americans were very skeptical of the federal courts. They were especially skeptical of the Supreme Court at various moments. And as a result, what they did is they designed a court that was meant to be representative of the nation, and also that included people who had been part of other political branches. So they had come from the cabinet, they had come from governorships, they had come from Congress. So the way that the court operated was to have this sort of connection to, American politics that we would think of as totally anathema to the way the court works now.
00:06:54 Andrew Keen: As somebody who's been married to two lawyers, I've always wondered, how and why America has fetishized the law. Was that always the case? Apart from Trump, of course, most of the postwar American presidents have one kind of law degree or another. [ed.: Of the postwar presidents, only Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Obama and Biden held law degrees.] Was the law always intellectually, at least, fetishized by the founders as this idea above politics?
00:07:26 Rachel Shelden: Many Americans at the founding hated lawyers, and there was an anti-legalist sort of approach to, the way people thought about the revolution, and the framing of the Constitution. But, of course, many of these people were lawyers. What it meant to be a lawyer in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not the same as it is today. Today, we have law schools that are organized around the casebook method where you study cases in order to understand of the Supreme Court. Most people did not go to law school in the nineteenth century. They served in apprenticeships. They did not have this sort of strict curriculum. And even when you did go to law school in this period, the casebook method didn't exist. That's the creation of the late nineteenth century. So being involved in the law did not necessarily mean being separate from other kinds of professionalization. There were many people who were lawyers and farmers, and many people who were lawyers and politicians because those were very compatible.
00:08:33 Andrew Keen: You've— We've talked about Supreme Court justices wearing the robes, so to speak. There's a religious quality to that given that America was also founded not just as a democracy or supposedly a democracy, but also, as a Christian nation. We've done many shows on the Christian foundations of the American Republic. Is there any crossover between religion and law in the foundations in your view of the republic? And whether law— Was the law or maybe even the lawyers some— Sometimes confused with priests? I mean, not Roman Catholic priests, but religious figures.
00:09:17 Rachel Shelden: Much more now, I would say, than at the founding. So one of my favorite things about the robes is that, you know, the justices enter their grand courtroom, which was not built until 1935. That's really shut off from the public at large. You can access the Supreme Court building, but you can't access the courtroom very easily. The court was located in the basement of the Capitol. It was actually the first floor, but lots of people referred to it as the basement. And so the justices did not have sort of a fancy separate setting for them to be almost worshiped the way they are now. And they didn't have separate rooms in which to change. So in the first half of the nineteenth century, there were pegs on the wall of the courtroom, and the justices would come in and take their robes and get dressed in front of the lawyers. So it was a very different kind of experience, I think, from what we imagine today, which is, you know, the justices are really separate from the people. They're really hard to access, and they operate in a very secretive way. And all of that would have been very surprising and upsetting to Americans who lived in the nineteenth century.
00:10:29 Andrew Keen: Yeah. It's a game. It's kabuki theater, and everyone knows one way or the other, they're biased. My wife, Phil, was recently at the Supreme Court, and she was struck still by how cramped physically it is. So in some ways, it hasn't changed. Isn't all this, Rachel? I mean, you— Your book's an important book, and I think like many important books, you're stating the obvious, but it's the obvious that most people aren't willing to acknowledge. Wasn't this just obvious that lawyers or justices, chief justices, or less chief justices, they're always bringing political baggage. Was this something that was even debated in the nineteenth century? Were there people who objected to the idea of the court being political, especially given— I know you write extensively about the role of the court in the Civil War and in the debates about slavery, especially given the intense debates and, of course, physical wars involved in nineteenth century America?
00:11:32 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. Very few people would have thought about the court as a separate body from politics. And when they did, they tended to think about it only in the context of growing the court's power. So there were some jurists who were very much in favor of a more powerful separate Supreme Court, Joseph Story being probably the most famous of these. But from the founding, people thought that the court should be political. It should be a representative institution. So what I mean by that is that, you know, you had seven justices on the court in 1807, and they were spread out around the country. So each justice came from a different region that was then a circuit. There were always the same number of circuits as there were judges, justices, and justices did not just serve in the capital. They also went out on circuit. So what that means is they went out and served as circuit judges at the same time that they were serving as Supreme Court justices. And circuit courts are not exactly like our circuit courts today. You know, we have, supreme circuit, district courts as our sort of, trajectory, backwards trajectory for the courts. But in the nineteenth century, the circuit courts were courts of original jurisdiction, so there were lots of jury trials. So justices would go to their circuit and hold jury trials in their circuit courtrooms and interact with the people of their region. And very importantly, they came from those regions, and they came from those regions having served in politics before. So they knew all of the political class when they went out on circuit, and they still interacted with them and advised, elections and campaigns. But this was not inappropriate. This was entirely accepted in part because justices did not have any kind of final authority over the Constitution. The people retained that authority, but also because there was an expectation that justices come from the political branches. They come from political positions, and they were gonna continue to talk about their politics once they're on the court. They don't just sort of leave their politics at the courtroom door. They— Their decisions are very much informed by politics because many of the political issues that exist, before you hear a case, before you get on the bench, actually translate afterwards. And then they— When they left the courtroom, they continue to participate in these conversations about politics, particularly their own constitutional views. They wrote newspaper articles. They, engaged in some public speaking about their opinions because this was part of the way people talked about the Constitution in that period.
00:14:15 Andrew Keen: Yeah. It brings to mind Tocqueville's version of nineteenth century America, highly political, very local, everyone having an opinion, including Supreme Court justices. So what happened during the Civil War, Rachel, when the country— When two sides of the country went to war with one another? What happened to the Supreme Court?
00:14:37 Rachel Shelden: Well, it— It's actually kind of the opposite of what you might imagine because the country's in crisis. And today, a country in crisis might immediately look to the Supreme Court to give some guidance about how things ought to operate. But the Supreme Court had very little to do in the Civil War because most cases didn't get up to them. Most of the constitutional conversation and concern happened in Congress and in the executive branch. So the court is engaged during the Civil War in much more sort of routine, kinds of cases, mundane cases. The Supreme Court had to hear every case that came to it in the nineteenth century, but also Congress could restrict the number of cases that got to the Supreme Court. And the Civil War is really a reflection of this, that the court was hearing all kinds of land cases, for example. Important cases for people who invested in gold, and gold extraction, especially, but not cases necessarily about fighting the Civil War. There were a few, but not that many. The question of emancipation, for example, doesn't go to the Supreme Court during the Civil War. At the same time, during the war, there is a continuation of the way that people think about representation on the court. So you might imagine that a new Republican Congress might come in and say, oh, no, we need to clean house. But what they do instead is rearrange the court so that there is better representation in the North and West. Whereas the South had five of the nine justices before the Civil War began. And so they— What they do is rebalance, create more equality in the country, on the Supreme Court. So there's a— There's an expectation that the court needs to be representative, but also that it is not gonna have these grand, pronouncements that tell people what they have to do during a moment of crisis.
00:16:33 Andrew Keen: Although I'm presuming that what you call this recalibration didn't thrill many people in the South.
00:16:40 Rachel Shelden: Oh, certainly not. But it happened during the war, so they were hoping that they were gonna be separate from the nation. So, you know—
00:16:47 Andrew Keen: What happens— During the war, were the Southern justices thrown off?
00:16:52 Rachel Shelden: No. So what happens is— It's a great question because they don't, you know, justices hold their position on good behavior according to the Constitution, and that had been read to mean life tenure. So, no, you couldn't get rid of the justices. But one justice secedes with the South, with the Confederacy, and one justice dies right before the Civil War, both of those from the South. So there had been five circuits before the Civil War in the South, and they just eliminate those two and put them elsewhere. So, you know, you had the eighth circuit in the South in the 1850s, and the eighth circuit moves to the West. So that's the way that they recalibrate. Right.
00:17:35 Andrew Keen: You keep on talking about they. They recalibrated. Who is the they— who is the they? Is it—
00:17:41 Rachel Shelden: They— Congress. The Congress. Yeah. Congress. Yeah. So, yeah, I mean, this is a really important, piece of thinking about how the court works is that Congress can regulate the court, did regulate the court, saw it as their responsibility to regulate the court, something that Congress doesn't really do. It sort of abdicated that authority today.
00:18:02 Andrew Keen: Yeah. Which is, of course, one of the great political issues. So you're a historian. Most historians are one way or the— one way or the other, even if they don't always admit it, nostalgic for the past.
00:18:14 Rachel Shelden: Okay.
00:18:15 Andrew Keen: Are you? I mean, this is a very intriguing book, Rachel, and I think it's a really important book for us to rethink how— What kind of Supreme Court we want in twenty-first century America. But is there a degree of nostalgia here in your forgotten history? Are you looking back and saying, well, that was a much better time before John Roberts, before Ruth Bader Ginsburg, before this general hysteria about the Supreme Court?
00:18:42 Rachel Shelden: Well, I think it's pretty hard to say that I have nostalgia for a nineteenth century that had slavery and horrible white supremacy. But in terms of the way that the court was structured
00:18:54 Andrew Keen: Yeah. And I'm not suggesting that you're nostalgic for slavery or any of that.
00:18:58 Rachel Shelden: But, of course, the court is, part of the political machine that makes all of that possible. So there was never a time when the Supreme Court was a particularly, you know, progressive institution in the nineteenth century. Really, peop— When people think about the court as a progressive institution, they think about the Warren Court in the mid-twentieth century. The nineteenth century court is super reactionary and really engaged in all kinds of terrible projects. But there are two caveats to that. One, the people didn't have to accept that, and they didn't. So after the Dred Scott decision in 1857, when the court rules that black people can never be, citizens of the United States and that Congress has no right to legislate for the territories, specifically talking, in this case about slavery, limiting slavery in the territories, the people reject that argument. The Republican Party runs in 1860 on a platform that says we are going to end slavery in the territories. So there was not this, understanding of the Supreme Court as the final authority. So that's a very different mode in which people engage with constitutional questions. I don't think we can go back to that. I don't think that's even a reasonable, idea to say that the court can have no final authority. I— We've gone past that. But having people engage in more constitutional conversation, I do have some nostalgia for that for sure. And then the other thing about the court in the nineteenth century that would be very different today is that when the court went out on circuit, when the justices went out on circuit and held jury trials, those juries were made up of white men and almost always white male property holders in the early period. If a justice were to go out on circuit today, that's not the population that he or she would be facing. They would be facing a population that is much more diverse, and much more inclusive. So I don't think we can go back. There's no sort of benefit even to suggesting that, but certainly some of the, ideas and values that people had about the court's relationship to the people, I think, are worth revisiting in any conversation about reform.
00:21:15 Andrew Keen: So we're gonna get, of course, to the question of how and when and why it changed. But before we get there, in the later part of the nineteenth century, after the Civil War, as America turned away from Reconstruction or the failure of Reconstruction and the reappearance of Jim Crow and all the rest of it, What was the Supreme Court's role or reaction in that history?
00:21:42 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. So in the Reconstruction period and, the period after, depending upon how you define Reconstruction, the court is, really no friend to civil rights, shuts down much of the sort of— The meaning of the congressional legislation promoting the Fourteenth Amendment granting birthright citizenship, and equal protection of the laws. And the Fifteenth Amendment, in terms of, black voting starts to really be, you know, undermined by the Supreme Court. So the court is no friend to, you know, the average black American in particular. But one of the reasons that I think this becomes so, problematic is that, you don't have that same reaction to the court in the 1880s and 1890s that you did in response to Dred Scott. Not because necessarily the people agree with what the court is doing, but because the court has grown its jurisdiction and its specialization, over the course of many years. So in the period just before the Civil War and then especially during the Civil War and after, Congress is gonna grant the lower federal courts way more jurisdiction than it had earlier in the century. So more cases are gonna go to the federal courts that have to do with this kind of issue. And there's good reason for that. Right? If you are someone who, wants to bring a k— If you're a black person who wants to bring a case in, say, Louisiana, you don't wanna take that to the state courts. You wanna take that to the federal courts. You have a much better chance of getting a fair trial in the federal courts. But the result of that is that the court's jurisdiction grows, And the court grabs some of that authority, by granting, for example, corporate citizenship. The idea of corporate personhood really starts to develop, and the court takes this and allows, you know, these cases to come to it through these changes in the way that people understand corporate personhood. So this is a big, shift that is caused both by good intentions and some ill intentions on behalf of the court.
00:23:58 Andrew Keen: So when did everything change? When did we get this promise or this ideal, which, of course, is totally unrealistic of a Supreme Court above politics. Are there individuals associated with the ideology, the ideal of this?
00:24:17 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. So I think maybe easiest to start with what is the myth and where does it come from. Right? So we have, today a longstanding story that Chief Justice Roberts and many others like to believe that's in textbooks, it's in, you know, taught in college classrooms and law school classrooms, is the idea that in 1803, John Mar— Chief Justice John Marshall, issued a very important opinion, Marbury versus Madison. And this important opinion, allowed the court to show its separation, from politics because it was saying we're an independent branch. We are not gonna have anything to do with these political branches. And also, that it was then going to claim this final authority over the Constitution. So that's the standard story that people hear. It's the story I learned in high school. It's the story I learned in college from some people. And I think this is the— This is a thing that is baked into the way that we talk about the court. This court now is quite obsessed with Marbury. It comes up all the time in oral argument and in decisions. But that is a product really of the late nineteenth century. Lots of reasons why it comes about, but a couple that, might be most useful for your listeners. One is the professionalization of the law. So lawyers in the 1870s and 1880s, start to really organize around the idea of law as a separate, space and as a profession that people need good training for in order to have their expertise. So you get the growth of law schools, you get the creation of the American Bar Association, and you get a push to think about the Constitution as the purview specifically of lawyers. The American Bar Association is quite important in this development of thinking about, the Constitution as a legal document. And then you also get, this moment in the 1880s and 1890s where Americans are celebrating their centennial. And when they celebrate their centennial, they rewrite the history. Right? This is what we do during these major events. We're in the 250th. We just started really the 250th anniversary of the, Declaration of Independence and the revolution, going into the 250th of the Constitution and up to 1790 when the Supreme Court first met. So in the centennial, when they celebrate in 1890, the Supreme Court, they write all kinds of histories. And by they, I mean, the justices, but also, people who tried cases in front of the court, the bar association, and there in— There are commissioned works. So at the centennial celebration in New York, there is a, you know, a someone who is assigned to write a history of the court and include the proceedings of this celebration. His name is Hampton Carson, and he publishes a quite large volume on the history of the court. And he tells this story of John Marshall, the great savior of American society, the Constitution, the apolitical nature of the court, and it becomes ingrained in the way that people start talking about the court. And it allows them to promote their idea that they are above political debate and therefore have more of a purview over the Constitution.
00:27:49 Andrew Keen: You— You've mentioned Roberts several times today. As I suggested, he's not the most popular fellow these days. Jacob Weisberg certainly doesn't like him. He's a man of conservative, a man of the right. I'm guessing politically from some of the things you've said, Rachel, that you probably are more of a progressive. But were people of the left as responsible as the right? Did this fetishization of Marbury and all the other things you talk about and write about in The Political Supreme Court? Did this come both from the left or the right, or was it perhaps in a weird way the foundations of modern American conservatism?
00:28:26 Rachel Shelden: This is a very good question, and there's an excellent new book, by Nikolas Bowie and Daphna Renan that really takes on this question. It's called Supremacy, and I strongly recommend it. I think one of the things that happens is that this conservative movement of thinking about the court as a separate body, and I will say that I think it is primarily conservative in the sense that, many people who believe that they cannot get things accomplished in Congress try to take their cases to the Supreme Court to make change. So that— And those people are the people outside of power. And the people outside of power in this period in Reconstruction, tend to be white southerners and their allies. So you get a lot of that, in the late nineteenth century. But what happens in the twentieth century is that a lot of progressives and people who are uncomfortable with the power of the court change the way they engage on the matter of judicial supremacy. So in the nineteenth century, if you didn't like what the court was doing, you would say the court doesn't have the power to do this. We're not gonna go along with it. But in the twentieth century, a number of progressives respond to this new narrative by saying, oh, that new narrative, well, I don't like it. We should push back against it. Not the narrative is wrong. So that's really where things become much more difficult to break through when you have this consensus about what existed in the past even though it's not historically accurate and even though there are many people who want the court to have less power. So the— This is sort of like a acceptance of mistaken history that has really— That really cost the left, in that context.
00:30:13 Andrew Keen: So how does the episode or the chapter on FDR and his attempt— Failed attempt to manipulate the court. How does it fit into your narrative?
00:30:24 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. So my book doesn't deal with FDR because it ends at the end of the nineteenth century, really, when this, starts to change, with a brief epilogue about the present. But the, court packing fight, I think, has been used for many years to, promote a view of expanding the court that is, negative, that is problematic. But historians have really changed the way we think about FDR or at least the way that historians think about FDR, and this, plan. In, one great example of this is a book by Laura Kalman, which deals with the question of whether FDR was actually being quite savvy in presenting this plan, to expand the court. And I think it's quite a convincing tale, that this is— This was a way to actually take advantage of his political popularity, and, ultimately, he got much of what he wanted even if the court did not expand.
00:31:30 Andrew Keen: So who were the great critics of this? I mean, we think of the great legal minds of twentieth century, Brandeis, Warren, all the others. Were there leading legal thinkers who warned, Americans that the idea of an apolitical Supreme Court was inconceivable and was always, a veil for one kind of political movement or another?
00:31:56 Rachel Shelden: Well, I think because people accepted the idea of a political Supreme Court, there wasn't a lot of necessity for that. The only time I would suggest that we have a real, discussion of that issue only from the perspective of the court's power is after Dred Scott because that is a moment in which the court tries to take on more power for itself, than it really possesses. And so the great voice in this moment is Abraham Lincoln, who says during his debates with Stephen Douglas and in his first inaugural address, we can't leave the power to the Supreme Court, essentially to these, nine unelected men, because we have— We will have then given up our responsibilities and our ability to have democracy. So Lincoln is a huge critic of the court, but, again, he's a critic of the court be— Because he believes it is acting beyond its power and also because it is unrepresentative, which is a big reason why he pushes for reform during the war.
00:33:01 Andrew Keen: Recently, we also had another scholar on the show, Michael— Michael Miller teaches at Brandeis [ed.: Miller teaches at Barnard College]. He's a constitutional scholar. He has a coauthored new book out called An American Problem: How the Country Built—and the Supreme Court Broke—the Voting Rights Act, of course, from, the 1960s. What's your take? Yeah. I know your book is on the nineteenth century Supreme Court, but what's your take on the way— And, again, John Roberts is not, particularly positive figure in Miller's narrative either. He blames, Roberts for undermining the Voting Rights Act. What's your take on the role of the Supreme Court over the last forty or fifty years in terms of undermining much of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s as well as, of course, the abortion issue.
00:34:02 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. I think a lot of this, I just wanna speak about it historically rather than as a policy matter, but I think a lot of this goes back to, the development in the last third of the nineteenth— of the twentieth century of, the idea of originalism. So, you know, originalism has gone through many iterations. It started, as a way to think about the original intent of the founders of the Constitution, and then developed into a variety of different other forms, including what a lot of the justices today say they subscribe to, which is original public meaning. How did, an average person in the public understand what the Constitution meant at the time? This— The development of this idea of a theory of constitutional law, that is very much about going and thinking about the past is really a recent development. So in the nineteenth century, judges did not necessarily have one theory of the Constitution. They used history. They used practical sense. They used, sort of the ideals of the framers. They used whatever they thought made sense in making determinations. But in the last fifty years, especially, we've really developed a conversation about the Constitution that requires some kind of theory. And originalism is really responsible for that. I think that a lot of the decisions in the Roberts Court are, caused by this obsession with the past. Certainly, the, decisions over the last five or six years have used the past a lot, but their history isn't very good. If you ask an average historian of the founding era whether these justices are getting their history right, they will tell you, no, not so much. And that is really a problem because using history as, a way to make decisions about the present means taking something completely out of context and then trying to apply it. And historians are generally uncomfortable with that. And I think it's quite, ironic because, of course, if you really thought about the history of the court from the eighteenth and nineteenth century, You would think about how much the court should not be engaging in this kind of, power growth, in terms of this kind of significant impact on American society because people would have been very uncomfortable with a court with that much power. So that's, I think, the deep irony of a court that is building its power on behalf of history, when history says that's not really what the court was designed to do.
00:36:49 Andrew Keen: Yeah. And I'm not sure whether we should admire the— What you call these originalists because they're actually using your argument to pursue their own interests—
00:36:53 Rachel Shelden: Sure.
00:36:59 Andrew Keen: Using the apolitical veil. So, I mean, isn't it up to the other side to counter that argument?
00:37:06 Rachel Shelden: Well, so historians— So I'm a member of an organization called the, Historians Council on the Constitution that is, run by the Brennan Center. And there are many historians who are on that board who participate in amicus briefs to try to show when the history is bad, that try to show a better way of reading the history. Some people want to do that. Other people don't engage in that kind of work and, are more interested in showing how the past was different from our modern context. So most of my work for them has been in trying to explain to people, that originalism is not the original way of thinking about the Constitution, and we don't have to agree with that. We don't have to assume that the past is necessarily important to the present. The past can tell you some things, but it can't answer our modern problems.
00:37:59 Andrew Keen: We've been told these midterms are enormously important. One of the consequences is the loss of one of the— I think he's one of the fathers of originalism, Samuel Alito, who may be retiring. Are we over originalism, Rachel, in your mind? Is, have we got beyond that? And might indeed a new age of American politics finally condemn originalism to, what it deserves perhaps? An early bath.
00:38:32 Rachel Shelden: It would be interesting to see. Right? But because, we have a court that is dominated by self-professed originalists, I think it's pretty hard to assume that's gonna change right away. I don't know what Alito is going to do, but, you know, he— There are still— There's still some time to replace him or whether the con— Whether Congress will— Or the Senate will actually, go along with that, I'm not sure. But I suspect that Alito's not gonna retire and then will continue to have originalist decisions or at least originalist infused decisions. There's a big difference between scholarly originalism and the originalism of the court, right, in practice. So I don't know that we're over it yet. We still have a lot, if we don't like originalism, which I don't think originalism is the way we should interpret the Constitution. If you don't like that, I think it requires, you know, real engagement with constitutional problems by a broader public in saying this is not how we see our Constitution.
00:39:34 Andrew Keen: One of the things that always confuses me about Donald Trump is on the one hand, he obviously considers himself above the law. On the other hand, he uses the law all the time to pursue his own interests. What would the founders have thought of him in terms of all these debates and conversations about the political or apolitical nature of the Supreme Court?
00:39:57 Rachel Shelden: You know, it's really tough to imagine what the framers would have said about, Donald Trump because they were so afraid of a president that became— That would become a king. This is the entire reason for the revolution. So the idea that you would have a president that is, this far from sort of participating in democratic process, I think, would have been really anathema to the founders. The— This is the problem, of course, with the— With trying to imagine our court today as it was in the nineteenth century. Our society is so different now. So we do need federal courts to put a check on, the president when the president is acting outside the boundaries of the law. I don't think we can go back to a time when courts did not have this authority, but the authority has to have legitimacy. So one of the things that's really important about the nineteenth century is that the justices had to interact with the people. So when they were making their decisions, they had to face the people. They had to be able to explain their decisions to the people. And we've lost that element of the Supreme Court, particularly in the twenty-first century with the, growth of the shadow docket, with the growth of, ways of thinking about judging that is increasingly secret, that would have been really surprising to people in the nineteenth century. So I think there are ways, that people who are in policy could think about using the past as an inspiration for the present in terms of thinking about the court, but it would be really hard, impossible, really, to go back.
00:41:36 Andrew Keen: Finally, Rachel, I know you end your book with a reference to the Justice Department stepping up its criminal inquiry of the Supreme Court abortion decision leak. This has reappeared again in the last few days. There was a big piece about it in The New York Times. What does this story tell us about the dangers of, the current assumptions of the Supreme Court?
00:42:02 Rachel Shelden: Yeah. So in the wake of the Dobbs leak in 2022, one of the things that happened was that the court, under Roberts' direction, put up fencing all around it, became more insulated. Right? And became more obsessed with this idea that the court needs to be separate from the people. And it's only grown since then. Roberts frequently talks about this, and he said this, in response to people criticizing the court for leaks, in the summer of 2022 that, you know, if the court did not have constitutional authority, final constitutional authority, he says, I don't know who would take up that mantle. But this is a really modern interpretation of the way that the Constitution has worked. And in— For most of American history, more people engaged in constitutional conversation and authority than do now. So he— He's erased. He's very much subscribed to the, John Marshall as a political savior [unclear] narrative and has erased all of this history that's come before, including about things like leaks. One of the things that I enjoyed very much while I was working on this book was seeing how often justices talk to other people about deliberations, about their decisions, about releasing that information before, it goes to the public. I hesitate even to call them leaks even though I do in the book, because it was so commonplace for justices to talk with other members of the government about what was going on and other— And lawyers who try the cases in front of them. So this is— This entire sort of story about the Dobbs leak, is very much out of place, in our American traditions. Now we're upset about a leak, and so we get this Justice Department investigation, unclear why now, maybe because of the election. But in general, this is a new way of thinking about information traveling outside the court.
00:44:15 Andrew Keen: And presumably, if the justices were exposed or had more access to the people as the people would have to the justices, then you'd have fewer conspiracy theories about the court, fewer lies about the court.
00:44:30 Rachel Shelden: P— People— The court got its legitimacy in the nineteenth century from that interaction with the people, from a belief by Americans that the court represented them, that the court had their best interest in mind, that their representative who rode circuit in their region had their best interest in mind. And we've really lost that tradition. And the justices have become further and further from the people, and grown their power as a result. And we might think carefully about how much more we could engage with the justices to try to get more legitimacy for them.
00:45:06 Andrew Keen: Yeah. It sort of— It brings to mind, the arguments of people like Hélène Landemore about, citizen assemblies and reforming American democracy. Maybe some of the reformers of American democracy can think about reimagining, rearchitecting the Supreme Court. Very interesting conversation. Very important, new book by my guest, Rachel A. Shelden. The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History, not so forgotten now that she's told it. Congratulations, Rachel, and, congratulations on making such an important argument in such an interesting political time. Thank you so much.
00:45:45 Rachel Shelden: Thank you so much for having me.