America's Grand Faustian Bargain: Alexander Mikaberidze on How the Louisiana Purchase Made the United States

00:00:31 Andrew Keen: Hello, everybody. It's Friday, July 3. Just one more day until the big celebration, the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the American Republic, 07/04/1776. And, when one thinks of the last two hundred and fifty years of American history, one could argue that the decisive moment wasn't so much the war of independence, but the Louisiana Purchase that happened a few years after independence. And as it happens today, there's a new book out on the Louisiana Purchase by my guest, Alexander Mikaberidze, who is a professor of history, at LSU and is joining us today, from Shreveport, Louisiana, where he lives. Alex, happy Independence Day. It's tomorrow. You're originally from Georgia. How are you gonna celebrate Georgia, in, in the caucuses rather than Georgia in, in America? How are you gonna celebrate, Independence Day tomorrow?

00:01:41 Alexander Mikaberidze: Well, first of all, have Independence Day, and thank you so much for having me, on your wonderful show. And, I've I do it traditional kinda all American way, hot dogs and burgers and getting together with friends and discussing, kinda our how fortunate really in many ways we are to be, to be here. I've been in United States for twenty six years, almost twenty six years, and, this has been quite a journey. And, everything I have, is really because of the wonderful people of this country that I now call home.

00:02:22 Andrew Keen: I'm not American, Alex, but I'm thanking you on behalf of the American nation. Your new book, which is published by Oxford University Press, has the subtitle, The Grand Bargain and the Making of America. Could one indeed argue that it is the critical moment in the creation of The United States? And had it not happened, you certainly wouldn't be there because you'd probably be living in Spain or France or some independent Latin American, Central American state. And the history of America or The United States would have been entirely different?

00:02:58 Alexander Mikaberidze: Absolutely. Yes. Certainly, Oxford University thinks so because it has a series called pivotal moments of American history, and for which this book has been, written and, have been, spent last, almost six years now working on it. I certainly believe that it is one of the most important moments, not just in American history, but in fact, I would say in world history. And then there are so many different ways you can approach this claim. Right? It certainly was an event that over the next of subsequent decades and generations reshape the American imagination and really stirred the ideas of the uniqueness of American experiment. You know, the Monroe doctrine, for example, if nothing else that came out just shortly after the Louisiana Purchase [as spoken: they were] is clearly rooted in the discussions that began in Louisiana Purchase. But it always comes back

00:03:59 Andrew Keen: To the Monroe doctrine, in a few minutes. But one of the things that I think surprises people who aren't experts on this is when one thinks of the Louisiana Purchase, of course, one thinks, well, The US purchased Louisiana from, from the French. But when one looks at the map, it's the entire Midwest. I mean, it's about a third of the continent of The United States. Give us some numbers, Alex, on the size of the purchase in terms of the acquisition price and the size of the land that The United States actually acquired?

00:04:41 Alexander Mikaberidze: So let me kind of divide my answer in two ways. One is what ultimately we agree as historians and maybe as a decision makers agree upon what the extent of the territory that is acquired. And, today, we are kind of the number that we all accept is 828,000 square miles which is about five thirty million acres of territory. But at the height of American claims as in 1803 to about 1806, United States actually claimed one almost 1,300,000 acres of land, which is far larger than kind of the 530,000,000 that we ultimately, talked about. So oh, hold on. Can I repeat myself? Or is it

00:05:32 Andrew Keen: No. You're allowed to repeat yourself, I'm not sure. Did you make a mistake?

00:05:36 Alexander Mikaberidze: Yeah. I think what I said is 1,300,000 acres when it's 1.3, million square miles as opposed to 828,000 square miles. So that's a It's

00:05:49 Andrew Keen: Coming back to the map. I mean Yeah. Maybe I put you on the spot in terms of numbers. Yeah. I mean, it's a it's a huge amount of land. I mean, even today when we look at it, it's the heart of The United States. It includes all of Oklahoma, Kansas, both Dakotas, much of Montana, Wyoming, Iowa. It's an astonishing It is. It's amount of land.

00:06:13 Alexander Mikaberidze: It's 13 states to be precise that ultimately kind of were formed from it. But the reason I'm talking about discrepancies because, one of the fascinating things about Louisiana Purchase is that when it was negotiated inside, ultimately, it was not the borders were not specified. It took United States, another sixteen years of prolonged negotiations and arm twisting to actually settle the boundaries. And so as part of that, discussion and debate over what exactly we acquired in eighteen o three, for example, you know, one of the hot topics was whether Texas was included. In fact, if you look at the earlier maps of Louisiana, at least how France envisioned Louisiana territory, the border ran on Rio Grande. So that would have been

00:07:00 Andrew Keen: It could have even been bigger. Well, it's it's bigger. So let's remind ourselves. In eighteen o three, America and the, the original American states had successfully revolted against the British, but much of the rest of North America or what we think of now as The United States was not, under the control of these original states. Who were the big players? It was Spain and France, of course.

00:07:26 Alexander Mikaberidze: Spain, France, and Britain. These are the this really, the power brokers in North America, Britain after 1763 controlling, all of what is today Canada plus, Florida, which, Britain will eventually lose in 1783 as, in the wake of American revolutionary war. Spain, meanwhile, controls after 1763 everything that is, West Of Mississippi. So they are for, from the river to the Pacific Ocean. So it's enormous wealth of territory.

00:07:59 Andrew Keen: Which of course now is California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona.

00:08:05 Alexander Mikaberidze: And France, when it

00:08:07 Andrew Keen: And Texas, of course.

00:08:08 Alexander Mikaberidze: That absolutely. And France, when it finally re it's gonna forces Spain to relinquish the control of the formerly of French Louisiana, then we have, the prospect of the French, restoration of the French control. And it is actually that prospect that really prompts, United States to accelerate the prospect of or they accelerate its diplomacy to acquire the territory because, you know, the fear in United States was that instead of the, quiet neighbors, many American diplomats at the time were referring to Spain, you're gonna have an aggressive and powerful imperial state, of the sorts of Napoleonic France. And it is that, negotiations the Franco Spanish negotiations of eighteen o two eighteen o one to eighteen o two that spurs the Americans to find a way to get, at least, the city of New Orleans, if not the, huge significant chunk of, of Louisiana territory.

00:09:13 Andrew Keen: And, of course, New Orleans being the port city that's, still the major city in Louisiana and one of the great cities, not just in North America, but in the world. You're, an academic expert, Alex, on, Napoleon Bonaparte. How central is he in the Louisiana Purchase? Is he the main player certainly outside The United States?

00:09:40 Alexander Mikaberidze: So the way I approach this book is slightly maybe different from, from previous of course. The Louisiana Purchase has been excessively written about. So what I wanted to do is look at the long kind of view of history, what the French call long. I can understand why Louisiana repeatedly has been, given away or attempted to be given away. And when I look kind of from that perspective, kinda looking at two hundred plus years of history, then what I realized is that in many ways, Napoleon, for all his genius and military and political acumen well, he's in many ways victim of the circumstances that he can't control. He's he's he's facing the structural developments, this long term developments that, really contributed to his ultimate decision to relinquish Louisiana. And what I mean by this is that, over the previous two hundred years, you have consistent themes of the imperial rivalries that divert Francis and Spain's attention away from Louisiana. For both French and Spanish empires, Louisiana is the least profitable and therefore least interesting colony. There's very little in terms of infrastructure development, little of investment, little of developing, the very things that would, you know, make this territory appealing. So when Napoleon comes around in 1799 and seizes power and then starts, kind of rebuilding the French colonial power, he envisions French call French Empire being rebuilt in the Western Hemisphere, but it would be centered on the Caribbean colonies. And we Which

00:11:24 Andrew Keen: Of course were more valuable what for their slave owning or their slave based economies?

00:11:35 Alexander Mikaberidze: Absolutely. Places like Saint Domingue, what is today, Haiti, or Martinique or Guadeloupe and Saint Lucia, that, are, producing profit margins as a simply inconceivable. If you look at the map of, Saint Domingue, the French part of the French part of the island of Hispaniola, what is today Haiti, that third of an island was producing, 40% of the world's sugar, and almost 60% of, coffee. And so

00:12:08 Andrew Keen: So yeah. So I take that point. So what was the independent of geopolitics, which I wanna come to in a minute, where was the value of the land that the French controlled in, in the in what we now think of as the Midwest in the center of The United States?

00:12:29 Alexander Mikaberidze: So that's one of the issues I kinda tried to pick apart in the book and point out that, France control only a few outposts, along the Mississippi River and have virtually no understanding of what is out in what we call Midwest. And in the in the outpost, the way the outpost is fortitude the lines of, forts and, line up on the Mississippi, it's clearly designed as a as a barrier to contain the English slash British expansion and both expansion in terms of territory, political influence, but more crucially commerce. And so from the very beginning when Lazzall sails down Mississippi in 1682 and then when Louisiana is officially formed, the idea here is this territory as a strategic barrier, that will be used to choke off the British competition. And so, the climate, the geography, I don't know if you've been to Louisiana, especially in the summertime.

00:13:30 Andrew Keen: I have, several times, and I'm actually happy I'm in San Francisco.

00:13:35 Alexander Mikaberidze: Exactly. I was about to say that,

00:13:37 Andrew Keen: I just there, Alex, is it?

00:13:39 Alexander Mikaberidze: I just came back from New Orleans, and I would give anything to be in San Francisco.

00:13:44 Andrew Keen: Yeah. Well, you're you're more than welcome to come here. So, I mean, excuse the vulgarity of this question, but did there really did the French have the right to sell this land? You note that it was a series of outposts, along the Mississippi. What gave the French the right to this land?

00:14:10 Alexander Mikaberidze: So that's a very important, question that I, took kinda head on, because I think, one of the best ways to grapple with Louisiana is to confront this myth, that exists, in for a long time that surrounded this topic, and that is the myth that United States overnight doubled the size that we bought the land. We actually did not buy the land as such. And, anyone, willing to spend time reading Jefferson's or Gallatin's if this is treasurer's secretary or any founding fathers documents, in from seventeen nineties forward, we'll actually get a very good sense of what United States was determined to acquire. And this is two things. One, they do know that the France has, or Spain too, effective control of particular areas. So for example, New Orleans is a big city. It's it's garrisoned. The European powers, whether France or Spain, has effective control of it. So there, you can talk about the purchase of the territory and the infrastructure. But in the rest of the territory, which is enormous as you we have seen, what we talk about is the right of preemption. In fact, there is a fascinating, meeting in February 1793 be in, in Washington, DC. No. Actually, not it's not in Washington, DC. I think that it's a meeting of the Washington's, cabinet. I don't remember whether it was meeting in the city or not. But it's a cabinet meeting, and Jefferson was cautioning, president Washington against making territorial claims beyond what where they officially recognized international borders of the American Republic. And the reason why he was doing a kind of questioning is because he understood that United States cannot simply negotiate with France or Britain or Spain and claim the land because there was an inherent understanding. This is a battalion international law that recognized the native indigenous right to sovereignty. And so in that meeting, Jefferson specifically talks about what he says is right of preemption of the Indian lands. And what he means is that in negotiations with French or the or Spanish or the British, United States should focus on claiming the right from the, to negotiate directly with native population. So and that's what the Louisiana Purchase really was. So the vast, territory that we acquired, we actually claimed the right of preemption. France, in exchange for the payment that we offered, agreed to give up its claims, in regard to the native plan.

00:17:00 Andrew Keen: So this gives the Louisiana Purchase a very different kind of dimension. Most people think that for $15,000,000, America acquired the entire Midwest. But you're suggesting all they really acquired for this money was the right to negotiate with Native Americans, the tribes, relations between, the original states and these peoples. Is that fair?

00:17:28 Alexander Mikaberidze: Absolutely right. In fact, we know what United States did after eighteen o three. It began it developed a special system, right, US Indian treaty system, which ultimately will include well over 200 separate sessions. And these are the direct negotiations that United States undertook with the native nations in order to acquire land. So what we can therefore talk is that there is not a single Louisiana Purchase, but rather Louisiana Purchase that consists of hundreds of transactions after 1803 that collectively allowed United States to claim the territory that we discussed. And so and that actually is important because, another myth that, that surrounds me that purchased is this convenient reference to $15,000,000 that supposedly went to purchase of the land. So once again, it didn't. But even there, the price can be a splice it's gonna splice in different ways. First of all, the $15,000,000 includes the number, several million dollars that went to cover the claims to the property damages that Americans, post against the French. So that should be excluded. But more crucially, that price does not encompass all those 220 plus treaties of sessions that United States ultimately negotiated with native nations. And if you collectively gonna look at what it costs us to acquire the land, and we're talking about the right to the land. Right? So then in as of 2026, that will be well over $12,000,000,000. So and that's times So different.

00:19:10 Andrew Keen: The way that the deal is normally presented to laypeople, Alex, you know this better than I do, is that the US got a great deal, and the French gave away something of massive value. What you're suggesting is, in a way, the French did a pretty good deal. They didn't firstly, they didn't really control the land. And secondly, all they gave up was the right to negotiate with the native people. So Bonaparte was commercially a cannier fellow than he sometimes presented. Is that fair?

00:19:42 Alexander Mikaberidze: I certainly try to point that out, because in spring of eighteen o three, in April, to be precise, there is an interesting meeting. It's in Saint Cloud, which is a small town, and with that kind of palace, on the outskirts of Paris. And the meeting, and the meeting is, attended by, Napoleon, as well as his minister of the marine and colonies, admiral Denis Desprets and the treasure minister Francois Barbet Marbois. And it's a crucial meeting because it is the meeting that effectively decides the future of this North American, French colonial empire. So it's, April ten to be precise. And at this meeting, Napoleon, essentially looks over strategic picture, and he points out that, France is struggling in Saint Domingue, that France is about to face an all out war against Britain, that France's fleet is in desperate need of repairs and expansion. In fact, I've looked at their French archives, and there's a fascinating report from that spring of eighteen o three from April that says that, the effective strength of the French naval power at the time was just 22 ships of the line, which is a pittance considering that, British Royal Navy had, at least four times that many numbers, deployed. And so, effectively, Napoleon understands the scale of the problem is staggering. So he's willing to make a very important political decision that is to give up on Louisiana territory because he understands, it will, empower United empower American Republic to be a counterbalance to the British on the other side.

00:21:32 Andrew Keen: And in terms of all this geo strategic stuff, how concerned were the British? Did they try and involve themselves in this purchase? I mean, obviously, they'd just been defeated, in the revolutionary war. But how serious was their interest both in the purchase itself and in the land that was theoretically being acquired?

00:21:56 Alexander Mikaberidze: So the British actually were, looking at this as choosing the lesser of the two evils. And the bigger evil for them is the prospect of Napoleonic, colonial empire being revived on the Western Hemisphere centered on the Caribbean, but with a significant presence in Louisiana. And from that perspective, they were perfectly willing to actually stay neutral in this transaction if the territory went over to United States. In many ways, the British looked at, the American revolutionary war not necessarily as a as a total defeat, but rather they look at it as a as a, yes, we lost the colonies, but we factually in terms of commercial financial, relationship, we're more than able to make up the losses. And it was in there in, from the point of view of Hawkesbury, for example, the, prime minister and others, it was perfectly, fine if United States acquired that territory, because ultimately, their goal at the time was to weaken

00:22:59 Andrew Keen: And what about given that the British controlled Canada, what about their the British's concern about the purchase in terms of their Canadian provinces?

00:23:16 Alexander Mikaberidze: They have, they don't have as of a, clear concern about possible, let's say, American expansion to Canada. We of course, that will later on will be attempted during the War of eighteen twelve. And as we know, American invasions, were unsuccessful. So the British are not as concerned about that. In fact, again, they are more concerned about the French revival of the French colonial enterprise in the Western Hemisphere. They're concerned about, for example, news that Napoleon is preparing to send 4,000 or so from troops to New Orleans and what those troops will do to displace the British interest across the Louisiana area including into the Great Lakes region. That's the, a greater concern. And Napoleon understands that. And so what he was worried is that if the war begins, that he will not be able to protect, the Port Of New Orleans, from the British attack. And so he's willing to give it away. But and this is where that meeting at Saint Cloud becomes so interesting is because he actually solicits, opinions from Decree, the minister of the colonies in the navy, and from the treasure minister. And the two men are diametrically opposite in terms of approaching this problem. Decree, for example, argues that colonies need to be protected at all costs, that, France will be able to safeguard its interest. And it kinda Decree looks at colonists as the as a crucial element of the French revival. Barbet Marbois, the treasure minister who actually spent some time in North America, is of completely opposite opinion. He says we need to get rid of it as soon as possible. Louisiana territory has been nothing but drain on our resources. And so ultimately, Napoleon agrees with that. And at the end of the meeting, he makes this fame kinda, you know, famous response that he's decided to, give it away. I know he's famous. He says, I renounce Louisiana. But what he's offering is he says, I'm willing to sell it for as long as CHF50,000,000. No. 50,000,000 is an interesting number because it's far lower than we actually paid for the rights of preemption. Right? And what he says here, 50,000,000 is for the rights of preemption. But when Barbara meets the Americans, he actually as a as a savvy businessman, and he actually, highballs Americans and tells them, you know, Buena Party is not willing to sell for anything less than 120,000,000. As it is, later through haggling, he slowly reduced it to 100,000,000, then 80,000,000, and

00:25:56 Andrew Keen: And so on. So all of this haggling from the American side, you've mentioned Jefferson several times already in this conversation. Who were the key American negotiators and visionaries of this deal? Jefferson is often credited with, imagining the role of, of these of this new territory in a United States? Is he still the key figure from The US's point of view?

00:26:24 Alexander Mikaberidze: Oh, as a president, certainly, he is the key figure, and, he sends a series of very interesting instructions that outline American position. But we should not forget that, you know, there are other, very, important figures involved, not the least, state secretary Madison, as well as the two, American ambassadors. So an ambassador and an extraordinary envoy. Our ambassador to Paris is Robert Livingston, who is, again, one of the among the very kinda interesting, individuals of the first generation of the American, forefathers, very, very prominent statesman from New York. And, of course, he's assisted in the spring of eighteen o three. Although if you ask Livingston, he would he would say that he kinda screwed things up.

00:27:13 Andrew Keen: But with Jefferson, I mean, you know, I'd take your point on all these other characters. But was Jefferson should we credit Jefferson with the vision of understanding the importance of this? He's often credited with it, not necessarily by specialist historians like yourself, but by generalists who see Jefferson as the key figure in the founding of the republic.

00:27:36 Alexander Mikaberidze: Of course. He's I mean, in that sense, he's a crucial figure. But, again, I would caution against giving him too much credit, because Jefferson is concerned. For example, until summer of eighteen o three, he's very concerned about the constitutionality of any of all everything that he's doing in, with regards to territorial acquisition. And that is actually one of the very important lessons of Louisiana Purchase. It unleashes, constitutional crisis over the power over the presidential power. So in eighteen o three, Jefferson is conducting a foreign policy that is not explicitly, described or sanctioned by the US Constitution. It doesn't US Constitution does not give the explicit power to US president to conduct anything of this sort. And so that the whole debate about where the president's authority ends, what can what can the US president do or not do, that is the debate that is engendered by the Louisiana Purchase.

00:28:37 Andrew Keen: And then that, of course, is not the first or the last time that there's been a debate about the powers of the presidency, especially when it comes to foreign policy. I know that both federalists and Jeffersonians were concerned over, as you note, the purchase's constitutionality. Who was most concerned? Was it the federalists?

00:29:00 Alexander Mikaberidze: I would actually, I would say that Jefferson himself is very concerned. In fact, so concerned that in July of eighteen o three, he prepares two constitutional amendments in order to deal with this issue of legality. So Jefferson is absolutely, worried about it, and so is the attorney general, of United States Lincoln, and others members of the cabinet. But the federalist, I think the one of the interesting things that makes, I think, the Louisiana Purchase in many ways relevant to our own discussion is the political theater that surrounds the Louisiana Purchase. Because here, in the debate surrounding losing the purchase, we see the two, quote, unquote, parties. Right? You know, the Republican Democrats and, the Federalists. They flipped their positions. So if Federalists during the previous two administrations were staunch proponents of central authority, federal government, and so on and so on, here in Louisiana Purchase, they actually denounce Louisiana Purchase because it was, in it was it would inevitably strengthen the federal government. And then the opposite is true for the Jeffersonians. The very people who were keen advocates of the state rights, including Jefferson, now become the great proponents of the expansion of federal government to unprecedented levels. One of the things you we should consider, for example, what was of great worry for the contemporaries was what would happen to the citizens or people living in the territories The United States acquired? Let's say an American citizen who left, Boston or Philadelphia and crossed the Mississippi and went and settled in the newly carved out territories. Would he or she be still, exercising their full rights? Would they be still citizens? Let's not forget that, for example, Louisiana did not become a state until, right, 1812. So if you were an American citizen and went to Louisiana territory, you would effectively be in a limbo because you'd be living in a territory that was governed by officials directly appointed by US President with no recourse to elections.

00:31:16 Andrew Keen: Yeah. There is certainly a colonial quality. And, of course, the great question on this, Alex, is the impact on Native Americans. Many of them, of course, died, some directly as a consequence of this acquisition, some as a consequence of, disease. Was the impact on the Native Americans of the Louisiana Purchase, what is it was it as catastrophic as many people suggest?

00:31:46 Alexander Mikaberidze: Yes. It was in many ways. So from Jefferson's point of view, when the negotiations began, the negotiations were about acquiring specific parts that includes New Orleans and effectively includes these portions of the Mississippi that were crucial as a commercial artery, that allowed much of the Western states to ship their goods out. Now, you know, Jefferson, once he realized what Livingston and Monroe, negotiated, he also understood how, utilitarian how useful this would be as a way of emptying territories East Of Mississippi of the native population. So in his correspondence, both cabinet described meetings and notes as well as the personal correspondence, Jefferson repeatedly outlined the plan where the native population living East Of Mississippi would be forced to relocate to this quote unquote vast wilderness West Of Mississippi. And, of course, that is what leads to the Trail Of Tears in, in Jacksonian era. But, of course, the subsequent expansion of America West Of Mississippi also has a devastating impact of the of on the native politics, on the native way of life, on native societies.

00:33:09 Andrew Keen: How, how aware were the native peoples, their leaders, their diplomats, their political leaders in this purchase? How were they both in terms of being informed by the parties and simply just being aware of what was happening?

00:33:33 Alexander Mikaberidze: No. They are not informed of kinda in informal ways or they are not aware of this transaction that's taking place on the other side of this of

00:33:41 Andrew Keen: The

00:33:41 Alexander Mikaberidze: Atlantic. Neither nor are they invited, to this formal transfer ceremonies that, take place in New Orleans and Saint Louis in spring of in the late eighteen o three and in spring of eighteen o four. But in subsequent negotiations, The United States repeatedly raises this question of the rights of preemption, that, based in the Louisiana Purchase. So it's the in later kind of negotiations that, the leaders of the indigenous, nations that effectively discover what has, transpired. And, of course, from their point of view, this is a gross violation of

00:34:22 Andrew Keen: Right. So as you know, that they weren't very happy about this to put it mildly.

00:34:27 Alexander Mikaberidze: But I do want to mention again that, the American statesmen, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and everyone else absolutely understand that the so the that, the natives have the sovereignty over the of this land. That is why they are so keen on securing the right to preemption. That is why they are so keen on negotiating. And in fact, only later on in the book, I point out that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly actually ruled in favor of the native sovereignty of the land. And the most famous of these, decisions were in 1828, for example, in American Insurance versus Cantor in which, the US Supreme Court declared that United States government possessed the, power to acquire a territory, because of the kind of war making and treaty making authority, but the territory actually belonged, to the nation.

00:35:31 Andrew Keen: So in a way, Alex, America comes out of this looking even worse in the sense that they knew exactly what they were doing. And then, of course, later developments, you've already mentioned Jackson, Veil of Tears, and all the rest of it. So in a way, this casts an even gloomier, darker picture of this purchase in terms of the, the fate of Native Americans.

00:35:57 Alexander Mikaberidze: I would say I would say so. Well, I think one way to look at it is that the fact that The United States actually, was willing to recognize the legal principle of the native sovereignty and agency engaged in negotiating the treaty of secession. Of course, how those treaties were negotiated is a separate topic, but I would also point out that supreme court, as I've noted in Johnson versus McIntosh in 1823, in Cherokee Nation versus Georgia in 'thirty one, or in Worcester against Georgia in 1832 consistently rules in favor of, again, legality of the sovereign right to land. I think the dark spots here are things like, Andrew Jackson's refusal to enforce the Supreme Court's decisions because that would have constrained the American expansion. So, yes, I think there are certain, aspects of it that I think, we can look it upon as making United States look worse than traditionally is, accepted.

00:37:07 Andrew Keen: And what about the issue of slavery, of course, which many people consider the original sin or alongside the treatment of Native American peoples, the original sin, of America? Jeffer Thomas Jefferson, of course, is very much associated with this original sin as a slave owner himself. Was there slavery in these French territories before this acquisition?

00:37:39 Alexander Mikaberidze: Yes. In fact, there is a very interesting kinda dynamic when we when we talk about slavery, which I try to address in the book. And that is, there are different modes of kinda slavery, so to speak. So for example, French, French system of slavery was far more, far more rigid than the Spanish. And the code noir that the French introduced in seventeen twenty's in Louisiana significantly restricted the interracial relations. The Spanish approach was far more lenient. In fact, Spain allowed multiple different venues for the enslaved people to acquire their freedom. And in fact, you know, the one of the institutions one of the kinda legal principles of Spain, for example, was known for is the principle of cortacion that allowed enslaved individuals to buy out to buy themselves out. And the Spanish legal system recognized, and because it derives its principles from the Roman law, it recognized the individuality or, you know, maybe not humanity of the slaves. And so it allows them certain rights and prerogatives, including the right, for example, to represent themselves and or to launch the proceedings, the legal proceedings against the owners. And we have repeatedly we have, such instances. The when The United States acquired Louisiana, territory, it's effectively acquired from Spain. I mean, the reason I'm mentioning this is that France negotiated the acquisition with, Spain for two years between eighteen o one to eighteen o three, but the French authority here barely lasted, just a few months if actually days, I would say. The formally United State, France acquires Louisiana territory only in November of eighteen o three and then gives it up in December '18 or '3. So, it's really the Spanish legal system. It's the Spanish institutions that United States acquired. And in comparison to Spanish, institutions dealing with slavery, American system was far more rigid. And that is one of the legacies of Louisiana territory, and that is expansion of slave trade and expansion of slave, the number of slaves introduced to Louisiana territory, but more crucially changing what the social economic, status of slaves. Now Jefferson himself has long been champion of this vision of America as an agrarian republic. He famously talks about The United States as the empire of liberty. And what he wants is to kinda essentially, help United States acquire this territory and, kinda create a land of free independent yeoman farmers. And he believes that by facilitating this process, he will help the slavery wither away, and that kinda historians later spoke about this, theory of diffusion that the more United States would spread. And, you have the kinda this stretching of American's fabric that slavery will, as long as the Transatlantic slave trade was closed, will slavery will, disappear. This Louisiana Purchase actually creates a, completely opposite reality. Because Louisiana the, the acquisition of this very fertile and, territory in Mississippi Basin that is very conducive to the, plantation style economy, It actually increased the, rationale for slave trade. So for many people don't realize this, but in spring of eighteen o three, South Carolina actually, banned slave trade, and it was on its way to kinda, dealing with this issue of slavery. And it is Louisiana Purchase that prompts this South Carolina and other states to unbend slave trade as a way of making money, by transporting

00:41:51 Andrew Keen: The to our territory. Alex, the subtitle of your book is the grand bargain in the making of America. Maybe it's you're missing a word. Maybe it should be the grand Faustian bargain in the making of America, the deal with the devil. You mentioned, especially when it comes to slavery and, of course, relations with the native peoples. You mentioned at the beginning the impact on the Monroe Doctrine. What was the relationship between, the Louisiana Purchase and this development of the Monroe Doctrine, American America's sense of itself in terms of the rest of the continent?

00:42:30 Alexander Mikaberidze: I are I argue that it is a foundational moment. It's actually what happens in the wake of losing the purchase is that United States understands that it be it's becoming continental power. That it's you have Lewis and Clark expedition, which by the way, for your listeners, there's a wonderful new book by Craig Fuhrman on the vast enterprise that kinda reassesses Lewis and Clark's expedition. But in Lewis and Clark and other expeditions that followed, it kinda gave United States a better understanding that it's it's a continental power, that it has nothing to fear from really from the South. And in fact, that's again as I said, Jefferson, spoke of Spanish empire as a quiet neighbor, as a docile neighbor, and that's another quote. And then

00:43:23 Andrew Keen: Well, these were the Spanish in Florida, of course.

00:43:26 Alexander Mikaberidze: Spanish in Florida, Spanish in Texas, or, out in the West. From American point of view, Spain is a very good neighbor because it is a weak neighbor. And already, for example, in 1789, there's an interesting book that is published by Jedediah Morse who wrote all kind of this study of geography and all. And Jedediah Morse in 1789 speaks about the need of American expansion into the Spanish territory. And he famously says that this is not merely a vision of fancy, but rather this is a precondition for what he calls, in fact, he writes it in capital letters, American Empire. And he envisions this western boundary of American Empire being, all the way in the Pacific. Right? And so that what Louisiana Purchase did is effectively, make this, you know, these ideas, these visions of the people like Jedediah Morse a reality. And in over the next over the subsequent decade, more and more Americans came around to envisioning, an empire. And, again, this is a term that's not an that is actually used by contemporaries. Almost every letter I've read discussing losing the purchase in the wake of, or the purchase talked about creation of, quote, unquote, of an empire, whether it's an empire of liberty of just Jeffersonian's vision or just an empire in a traditional sense that many Americans, statesmen believed was the only way American republic can survive in this hostile world of the great powers. And the Monroe Doctrine is a direct result of such, ideas and discussions.

00:45:13 Andrew Keen: Yeah. So maybe, subtitle should be the Grand Faustian Bargain and the Making of the American Empire. Finally, Alex, you've been very generous with your time, and tomorrow is the big day. I'm sure you're eager to prepare all those hot dogs and all your fireworks for tomorrow. Could we imagine a world where the Louisiana Purchase hadn't happened? What would it be like? I know it's a rather childish question, but could you imagine that world? I'm sure you've given it some thought in terms of this book.

00:45:49 Alexander Mikaberidze: I actually don't think it is a childish question to quote you. I actually think those kind of questions are very important to consider the contingency of history. And that's one of the things I always talk to with my students, both, you know, to emphasize the complexity, but also contingency of history, how things might have developed. So, for example, one of the contingencies is what might have happened if Bonaparte had sanctioned an expedition of those roughly 4,000 French troops, veteran troops, to a port of New Orleans in eighteen o two. The expedition was preparing. It was ready to sail in, October of eighteen o two, and the bad weather, delayed its departure, and then it was too late. So what might have happened if those troops actually arrived here? Now my argument is that if the truce arrived and that's a sign that's actually would have been a massive deployment of French power, the largest deployment of the French power since the American Revolutionary War. Right? So that might have encouraged Napoleon to retain effective control of southern portions of Louisiana territory. And more crucially, the subsequent history, especially during the war of eighteen twelve, shows us that, the native, resistance had an op had the chance of succeeding against, American expansion if it was supported by an, great power. So I'm I'm referring, for example, Tecumseh's, famous, resistance against United States with the support of Britain. Now what I can envision, for example, a scenario of having a French garrison, a sizable garrison down in New Orleans and France who that historically had a very close relationship with, native, nations, kinda cultivating that relationship in order to maintain, presence deep inland and essentially leveraging it as a way of constraining American expansion. So then the question is what American Republic would have looked like without access to the hinterland, without the, the resources that we have, kinda utilized to really become a superpower of the in the twentieth century. And that is a very interesting question. I still believe that parts of, United States would have developed and would have become economically vibrant, certainly in the North Northeast and New England area. But the American republic certainly would not have acquired the status, you know, the global status that it did without the continental reach, the safety, the resources that was in a purchase, pushed it for towards.

00:48:29 Andrew Keen: In other words, on July 4, rather than hot dogs, maybe the peoples of Kansas and Oklahoma and Dakotas, Nebraska would be celebrating with, croissant.

00:48:41 Alexander Mikaberidze: Or tacos and moles.

00:48:43 Andrew Keen: Oh, yeah. Probably even more tacos and moles. Well, Alex, wonderful conversation. The book is out today, appropriately enough, the day before July 4. It's the Louisiana Purchase, The Grand Bargain and the Making of an America, The Making of America. Not the first or the last book about the purchase, but, as it's published by, Oxford University Press, one of the more credible and important. You've spent six years on it. So congratulations, Alex.

00:49:12 Alexander Mikaberidze: Thank you so much.

00:49:12 Andrew Keen: And, happy Independence Day. Have a lot of fun with your hot dogs and fireworks tomorrow. Thank you so much.

00:49:18 Alexander Mikaberidze: Happy Independence Day.